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THE LEGAL ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE:
THE ROLE OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE IN
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION
Kevin Outterson*
ABSTRACT
Antibiotic effectiveness is a common pool resource that can be
prematurely depleted through resistance. Some experts warn that we
may face a global ecological collapse in antibiotic effectiveness.
Conventional wisdom argues for more intellectual property rights
to speed the creation of new antibiotics. Recent theoretical literature
suggests that conservation-based approaches may yield superior
results. This Article describes a novel typology for organizing these
emerging theories and provides an early empirical test of these models
using proprietary data on the sales of vancomycin, an important
hospital antibiotic for the last three decades.
The results challenge the assumptions in several models and will
force a re-evaluation of the role of intellectual property rights in
antibiotic resistance and conservation. In particular, insurance
reimbursement may be a more effective policy lever than patent law to
preserve antibiotic effectiveness.
I. THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTIBIOTIC COMMONS
Antibiotics may be the greatest single medical success of the
twentieth century. But this achievement rests on an insecure
foundation. As antibiotics are used, they create evolutionary pressure
that threatens their undoing through resistance.1 In a post-antibiotic
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. My thanks to Dr. Marc
Lipsitch of the Harvard School of Public Health for his assistance in the biology of resistance,
and Aaron Kesselheim, M.D., at the Harvard Medical School, for our joint work relating to
innovative coordination mechanisms for antimicrobial conservation.
Other reviewers include Michael Meurer, Ursula Theuretzbacher, Gary Lawson and
Wendy Gordon. This Article was presented at the Healthcare Fragmentation Conference at
Harvard Law School in June 2008; the Boston University Law School faculty workshop in
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world,2 some of the advances in health over the previous seventy-five
years would be threatened.3 The edifice of modern medicine assumes
the efficacy of antibiotic therapies as a foundational tool.
Antibiotic effectiveness is correctly viewed as a valuable common
pool resource4 akin to verdant forests, productive fisheries, and a stable
Greenland Ice Sheet. Common pools are prone to depletion and
collapse through uncoordinated withdrawals. In the case of antibiotics,
withdrawals occur as antibiotic resistance grows through use and
misuse. We face a tragedy of the antibiotic commons as uncoordinated
use and misuse of precious antibiotics may prematurely destroy these
important drugs.5
September 2008; the Drug Policy Research Group at Harvard Medical School in October 2008;
and at several meetings of the Drug Resistance Working Group at the Center for Global
Development. This work is supported by research grants from The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, Resources for the Future; the Boston University School of Law; the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation; and an in-kind grant from IMS Health.
1 The relationships between use and resistance are not linear and are occasionally negatively
correlated. Marc Lipsitch, The Rise and Fall of Antimicrobial Resistance, 9 TRENDS IN
MICROBIOLOGY 438, 441-42 (2001).
2 Per Nordberg, Dominique L. Monnet & Otto Cars, Antibacterial Drug Resistance, in
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PRIORITY MEDICINES FOR EUROPE AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC
HEALTH APPROACHES TO INNOVATION ch. 6.1 (2004), available at http://archives.who.int/
prioritymeds/report/index.htm; Richard P. Wenzel, The Antibiotic Pipeline—Challenges, Costs,
and Values, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 523 (2004) (“Currently, the antibiotic era is
threatened . . . .”).
3 Many commentators focus on the devastating return of infectious diseases in a postantibiotic era. See, e.g., RAMANAN LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., EXTENDING THE CURE: POLICY
RESPONSES TO THE GROWING THREAT OF ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE 1-28, and sources cited
therein (2007); William M. Sage & David A. Hyman, Combating Antimicrobial Resistance:
Regulatory Strategies and Institutional Capacity, 84 TULANE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=1436154, at 3-4. But the majority of the decline in 20thcentury infectious disease mortality in the United States occurred before the introduction of
antibiotics. Gregory L. Armstrong, Laura A. Conn & Robert W. Pinner, Trends in Infectious
Disease Mortality in the United States During the 20th Century, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 61, 63
fig.1 (1999) (showing a decline in infectious disease mortality rates in the United States from
about 800 per 100,000 persons in 1900 to less than 400 per 100,000 persons prior to 1935).
Nevertheless, much of the current practice of medicine in U.S. hospitals and ambulatory surgical
centers depends upon effective antibiotics and would undergo radical changes in a post-antibiotic
era.
4 Several authors have written of antimicrobial effectiveness as a common pool resource.
See LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3; Eric Kades, Preserving a Precious Resource:
Rationalizing the Use of Antibiotics, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 611 (2005); Kevin Outterson, Julie Balch
Samora & Karen Keller-Cuda, Will Longer Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public
Health?, 7 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 559 (2007) [hereinafter Outterson et al., Antimicrobial
Patents]; Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical
Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 78-80 (2004) [hereinafter
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain]. Some consider antimicrobial effectiveness a public good.
See, e.g., RACHEL NUGENT ET AL., CENTER FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT, PROTECTING DRUG
EFFICACY AS A GLOBAL HEALTH GOOD: DRAFT REPORT OF THE DRUG RESISTANCE WORKING
GROUP (Dec. 5, 2008) (on file with author); Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 8. But antibiotics
themselves are not public goods: Consumption is rivalrous through resistance, and exclusion is
possible through global intellectual property law.
5 For a general introduction to the tragedy of the commons, see Randall R. Dipert,
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This Article focuses on three important policy questions
concerning resistance. The first is the tension between production of
new antibiotics and conservation of existing drugs. At first blush, both
seem to be laudable goals, but in many ways conservation and
production work at cross purposes, and difficult choices must be made
between them. For example, antibiotic conservation suppresses demand
for antibiotics by controlling infectious diseases and curbing
inappropriate use. Viewed from the perspective of new drugs, these
programs undercut market incentives by dampening future demand.
This is known as the “conservation dampens production” hypothesis, as
discussed at length below.6 But from the perspective of public health,
infection control is an unqualified success when infections are
prevented. Another
important
hypothesis,
“patent
holder
conservation,”7 posits that patent holders will be careful stewards of
antibiotics, promoting conservation through patent law. This Article
explores these concepts and suggests that greater emphasis should be
placed on conservation, but not necessarily through patent law.
The second question is the relationship between resistance and
innovation. The conventional wisdom assumes that resistance is a
problem in antibiotic innovation, but this Article argues that resistance
may actually stimulate innovation rather than retard it.8 Resistance
makes highly effective antibiotics obsolete over time, which clears the
competitive field before a new drug enters the market. This process of
creative destruction may favor innovation.
The final question evaluates the policy levers employed in the
battle against antibiotic resistance. This Article questions the current
reliance on patent law to solve antibiotic resistance problems. For
example, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) correctly
identifies the need for effective antibiotic therapies, but has mistakenly
called for significant changes in patent law to remedy the problem,
including patent extensions and wildcard patent extensions9 for
Sidestepping the Tragedy of the Commons, in THE COMMONS: ITS TRAGEDIES AND OTHER
FOLLIES 27 (Tibor R. Machan ed., 2001); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
6 See infra Part II.C.
7 See id.
8 This is the “resistance stimulates innovation” hypothesis, discussed infra Parts II.C and
III.C.
9 A wildcard patent extension grants additional years of patent life on any drug of a
company’s choice if the company achieves some socially desirable goal⎯in this case,
development of a novel antibiotic. Wildcard patent extensions have generated sharp academic
exchanges in recent years. See Jorn Sonderholm, Wild-Card Patent Extensions as a Means to
Incentivize Research and Development of Antibiotics, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 240 (2009)
(supporting wildcard patent extensions); Amy Kapczynski, Commentary: Innovation Policy for a
New Era, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 264 (2009) (critiquing Sonderholm); Outterson et al.,
Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 561-62 (finding wildcard patent extensions to be
inefficient, unfair, and possibly unconstitutional); Brad Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance and
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antibiotics.10 Patent law mechanisms are ill-suited to address this
problem, in part because pharmaceutical prices in the United States are
not really set by the market.11 To the extent that market-based pricing is
an important element of the patent system,12 its absence in
pharmaceuticals is quite troubling. If the primary market signals are
muddled or broken, additional patent-based programs should not be
rolled out before the reimbursement system is fixed.13
Insurance reimbursement is a powerful tool that is not well
deployed to promote continued antibiotic effectiveness. As discussed
infra Part III.C, reimbursement has created both helpful and perverse
financial incentives. The former improves access to drugs through third
party reimbursement; the latter hinders conservation and allows
hospitals and physicians to receive additional payments for out-ofcontrol infections and unnecessary prescriptions. Private incentives and
social goals are seriously mismatched. But perhaps it is easier to fix the
reimbursement system than to implement effective patent-based
solutions. If so, our policy focus should be on reimbursement rather
than patents.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II maps the theoretical
terrain surrounding the tragedy of the antibiotic commons, with an
emphasis on organizing existing approaches into a new typology, found
in Table 1.14 The goal of this exercise is to place existing work into six
theoretical categories and to identify missing elements in the current
literature. Seven key hypotheses from the most relevant theories are
then collected and summarized in Table 2.15 For example, one
hypothesis is called “patent holder waste” because it posits that an
antibiotic patent holder, facing imminent expiration of its patent, may
be inclined to waste the asset (from society’s viewpoint) through
overzealous marketing before the patent enters the public domain. The
patent holder waste hypothesis, if proven, offers patent law as a possible
antibiotic conservation tool: With a longer patent, the drug company
Antibiotic Development, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 211-12 (2008) [hereinafter Spellberg,
Antibiotic Resistance] (critiquing Outterson et al.); Kevin Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance and
Antibiotic Development—Author’s Reply, 8 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 212-14 (2008)
[hereinafter Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance] (responding to Spellberg’s critique); B. Spellberg et
al., Societal Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to Spur Critically
Needed Antibiotic Development, 35 INFECTION 167 (2007) [hereinafter Spellberg et al., Societal
Costs Versus Savings] (supporting wildcard patent extensions for antibiotics).
10 INFECTIOUS DISEASES SOC’Y OF AM., BAD BUGS, NO DRUGS: AS ANTIBIOTIC DISCOVERY
STAGNATES . . . A PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS BREWS 22-26 (2004) [hereinafter BAD BUGS]. This
report was a call to action from the leading infectious diseases society in the United States.
11 See infra Part III.C.
12 See infra Part III.C.
13 Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially Neutral Patent
Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 1056-57 (2008).
14 See infra Part II.B tbl.1.
15 See infra Part II.C tbl.2.
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could manage the antibiotic more in keeping with society’s long-term
interests. This Article casts some doubt on the validity of the patent
holder waste hypothesis, as well as several other proffered hypotheses.
Since context matters, Part III is more practical in orientation,
exploring the institutional and legal structures in the U.S. market that
directly affect continued antibiotic effectiveness, including the central
role of reimbursement (in Part III.C). This Part also draws heavily upon
the biomedical evidence on resistance, since resistance involves
biologically complex systems with many heterogeneous elements. To
adequately understand and model resistance, understanding both the
biological and legal ecology is vital.
Part IV is the case study on vancomycin, using proprietary sales
and volume data for this important antibiotic over the past few decades.
Vancomycin sales and patent data are evaluated with respect to two of
the most important conditions related to antibiotic resistance:
Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD) and methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The data are placed in the
context of U.S. markets for antibiotics, including the relevant patents
and insurance reimbursement systems.
The case study challenges several key hypotheses from Table 2.16
For example, the “resistance stimulates innovation” hypothesis is found
to be supported, upending conventional wisdom. Resistance appears to
have an overall positive effect on antibiotic production, at least from the
public health perspective. On the other hand, the vancomycin case
study does not support the “patent holder waste” hypothesis, since
limited patent terms do not appear to have encouraged vancomycin
waste. The evaluation of the seven hypotheses in light of the case study
is found in Table 3.17
This Article also challenges the assumption that intellectual
property law is the key policy lever for antibiotic markets. The
language of intellectual property has been an important framing tool,18
but other market structures are equally or more important for antibiotics,
especially insurance reimbursement. If we repair the broken
reimbursement system for antibiotics, patent changes may not be
necessary at all.
The stakes are huge for getting these policies right; the Infectious
Diseases Society of America warns that the alternative may be a global
ecological collapse in antibiotic effectiveness.19

16
17
18

Id.
See infra Part IV.C tbl.3.
Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008).
19 See BAD BUGS, supra note 10.
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II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO COMMON POOL DEPLETION PROBLEMS
Tragedies of the commons can be addressed through law. Three
legal mechanisms have been used in other contexts: private coordination
through property law, public coordination through regulation, and
private coordination through contract.
A.

Property, Regulation, and Contract

The first mechanism is privatization—enclosure of the commons—
through property rights.20 The archetype is the overgrazed common
pasture facing ecological collapse. The common pasture first becomes
private property, and then the new owner manages the resource with
property law. The consolidated owner or firm, it is hoped, manages the
property for long-term sustainability. The “patent holder conservation”
hypothesis is an application of this narrative, substituting public domain
antibiotics for common pastureland.21 We will call this approach
“property.”
The second legal mechanism is public coordination through
regulation. The federal and state regulation of air pollution is a prime
example. The atmosphere itself is not easily privatized, and the number
of polluters is too large for private coordination, so regulation is a likely
tool.22 We will call this approach “regulation.”
The final legal mechanism is private coordination through contract.
When transaction costs are low enough, contract can be used for private
coordination, often in conjunction with property law.23 In addition,
groups can sometimes manage common resources through informal
mechanisms to prevent uncoordinated use and withdrawals.24 With due
regard for the potential for informal coordination, we will nevertheless
call this approach “contract.”
When property, regulation, and contract tools are all plausible
options, the ideal policy surely depends on the context. For some
20 For a critical view, see James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
21 See infra Part II.C.
22 If one focuses solely on downwind property owners, and their number is small, pollution
externalities could be resolved in contract. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). When the number of parties and transaction costs grow, contract evolves
into either the firm or social contract (i.e., regulation).
23 Id.
24 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1994); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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common pools such as pastureland, property rights may be an effective
primary regime. For the Greenland Ice Sheet, direct property rights are
an unlikely path to success. Even if we were willing and able to
privatize the Greenland Ice Sheet, most of the damages and benefits
would not easily be internalized to the owner. The owner would find it
difficult to collect fees from the low-lying regions of the world
threatened by a rise in sea levels and would find it equally difficult to
influence the behaviors of billions of people partially responsible for
climate change in order to protect the integrity of the common pool
resource. This problem appears to be a candidate for global regulation.
Nevertheless, property rights and contract may still play a prominent
part. Property rights might slow global climate change through
property-based contract schemes like carbon “cap and trade”
programs.25
In some contexts, mixed approaches dominate. Many forests are a
mix of public and private ownership, but even privately owned forests
are sometimes regulated for various public benefits. Multiple
companies may own and tap large pools of underground oil, but legal
regulation can attempt to protect the joint oil pool when private contract
falls short.26 Other examples could be offered, but in each one the ideal
mix of property rights, regulation, and contract is likely to vary
considerably according to the context. As Coase noted:
[D]irect governmental regulation will not necessarily give better
results than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the
firm. But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such
governmental administrative regulation should not lead to an
improvement in economic efficiency. This would seem particularly
likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large
number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of
handling the problem through the market or the firm may be high.27

We will return to context in Part III.
B.

A Legal Typology of Resistance

Like the collapse of global fisheries,28 we may be experiencing an
ecological crisis through biological resistance.29 Legal institutions must
25 U.S. State Governments Join International Carbon Action Partnership on Global Cap-andTrade Carbon Markets, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 162 (John R. Crook ed., 2008) (describing the use of
cap-and-trade carbon markets to reduce global carbon emissions). Bill Sage and David Hyman
have discussed this concept for antibiotics as well. Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 16.
26 See, e.g., EUGENE KUNTZ ET AL., LAW OF OIL AND GAS (2009).
27 Coase, supra note 22, at 18. Coase also notes a third option: doing nothing at all when the
costs of regulation exceed the costs of the underlying problem.
28 Plenty More Fish in the Sea?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 2009, Special Report, at 10.
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evolve to confront this crisis, with the goal being continued antibiotic
effectiveness. The conventional prescriptions in the policy literature are
familiar: (1) public health regulation to dampen demand and conserve
existing antibiotics (conservation or demand-side tools);30 and (2)
incentives to create new antibiotics, typically through intellectual
property rights and government grants (production or supply-side
tools).31
Conservation/Production are a related dyad for antibiotic common
pools, similar to the Property/Regulation/Contract coordination
discussion immediately above. Mapping these elements onto a simple
grid creates the following Table 1. This approach organizes existing
tools into six sectors. Any particular sector should not be mistaken as
the ultimate objective. The policy goal is not more drug patents (Sector
2), better conservation programs (Sector 3), or more efficient insurance
reimbursement (Sector 5), but the continued availability of effective
antibiotic treatments when needed.

29
30

See BAD BUGS, supra note 10.
For a classic book length introduction, see STUART B. LEVY, THE ANTIBIOTIC PARADOX:
HOW THE MISUSE OF ANTIBIOTICS DESTROYS THEIR CURATIVE POWERS (2d ed. 2002); see also
DEPT. OF COMMUNICABLE DISEASE SURVEILLANCE & RESPONSE, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, WHO GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR CONTAINMENT OF ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE
(2001). For a recent review, see Aaron S. Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Fighting Antibiotic
Resistance—Innovative Strategies to Promote Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness, 29 HEALTH
AFF. (forthcoming 2010).
31 See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry—Prices and Progress, 351 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 927 (2004) (presenting an authoritative overview on the relationship between
patented drug prices and R&D). Otto Cars and colleagues advocate both approaches in concert.
Otto Cars et al., Meeting the Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 337 BRIT. MED. J. 726 (2008).
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Table 1. Legal Approaches to Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness

Property

Regulation

Contract

Conservation
1. Patents as conservation
tools to privately
constrain demand.
3. Public health infection
control and regulatory
antibiotic stewardship
programs regulate
demand for antibiotics.
5. Insurance
reimbursement could be
deployed as a
conservation tool.

Production
2. Patents as incentives to
bring new antibiotics to
market.
4. FDA regulations could
be relaxed to speed
approval of new antibiotics.
Tax subsidies support
antibiotic research and
development.
6. Prizes, grants, and
generous reimbursement
could support antibiotic
research and development.

This typology can help identify policy gaps among the six sectors.
For example, it is often assumed that antibiotic production incentives
are largely property-based, rooted in intellectual property law to foster
the introduction of new antibiotics,32 but the production column of
Table 1 identifies other options, including modifying U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations and creating prizes and grants
for new antibiotics. Conversely, antibiotic conservation programs are
generally described as regulatory approaches, without sufficient
discussion of possible property-based and contract-based conservation
tools.33 The conservation column of Table 1 identifies some alternative
approaches, including insurance reimbursement as a contract-based tool.
More fundamentally, it is important to view production and
conservation as separate but interrelated realms and to focus appropriate
attention on both. Our energy policy once suffered from a singular
focus on production and neglected conservation. Today, a broader
consensus supports government intervention in favor of both production
and conservation.34 Politicians and economists debate their relative
importance but generally support incentives for both as complimentary
strategies. For antibiotic policy, a similar consensus has yet to translate
into effective action. Sector 3 public health programs, such as hospital
infection control and rational use of antibiotics, are commonly

32
33
34

See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10.
See, e.g., LEVY, supra note 30.
See, e.g., American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
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applauded, but the structure of our health care system funnels
remarkably little money to them. As a result, policy options in Sectors
3 and 5, such as reimbursement for conservation, are starved for cash.35
The U.S. health care system spends most of the relevant financial
resources in Sector 2, to the detriment of the other policy options.
In a similar fashion, most of the relevant legal scholarship has
focused on IP solutions in Sector 2, such as drug patents.36 Patents are
particularly valuable for the pharmaceutical industry.37 Patents and
intellectual property law allow pharmaceutical companies to earn excess
profits from health insurance companies, government health programs,
and consumers. Patent-based drug companies can charge higher prices
during periods of marketing exclusivity,38 which in turn support
investments in research and development (R&D). Patents may also
35 Otto Cars et al., Meeting the Challenge of Antibiotic Resistance, 337 BRITISH MED. J. 726,
726 (2008) (“However, sufficient financial and human resources to implement the strategy were
never provided.”); see also NUGENT ET AL., supra note 4, at 35-38; Richard S. Saver, In Tepid
Defense of Population Health: Physicians and Antibiotic Resistance, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 431
(2008) (emphasizing physician demand-side conservation issues).
36 For an overview, see COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB.
HEALTH, WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH: INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 22 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/
ENPublicHealthReport.pdf [hereinafter WHO CIPIH Report]. For an introduction to the legal
literature, see Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the Amended
TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Verses Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004). For an introduction to the
economic literature, see Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 247, 247-48 (1994); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276-77 (1977); F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent
Life: A Geometric Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 427 (1972).
37 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL JAMES MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 14 (2008).
38 In addition to patents, drug company products may enjoy additional periods of marketing
exclusivity based on regulatory standards. In the United States, the FDA often manages these
additional periods of exclusivity. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006) (establishing general five-year
period of data exclusivity); The Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2006) (granting
seven years of data exclusivity for qualifying orphan products); U.S. FDA, DEPT. HEALTH &
HUMAN SERV., THE PEDIATRIC EXCLUSIVITY PROVISION: JANUARY 2001 STATUS REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval
Process/DevelopmentResources/UCM049915.pdf (granting six-month extension for pediatric
testing). Data exclusivity periods operate independently of patent law and have been the subject
of several controversial bilateral trade negotiations. See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES, BRIEFING
NOTE, ACCESS TO MEDICINES AT RISK ACROSS THE GLOBE: WHAT TO WATCH OUT FOR IN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES 4-6 (2004); Ken J. Harvey et al., Will the
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement Undermine the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme?,
181 MED. J. AUSTL. 256 (2004); Kevin Outterson, Agony in the Antipodes: The Generic Drug
Provisions in the Australia–USA Free Trade Agreement, 2 J. GENERIC MED. 316 (2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=787224; M. Kevin Outterson,
Free Trade in Pharmaceuticals, 181 MED. J. AUSTL. 260 (2004); Teva Opposes 10-Year Data
Exclusivity Provision for Israel, GENERIC LINE, May 5, 2004; Hadas Manor, US to Israel: Grant
5-Year Exclusivity for Ethical Drugs, GLOBES ONLINE, July 1, 2004, http://www.globes.co.il/
serveen/globes/docview.asp?did=810543&fid=942.
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create access problems.39 This literature is valuable and interesting, but
generally does not analyze antibiotics separately.
More novel and germane to antibiotic resistance has been the
attempt by a leading professional society and others to expand patent
law as an incentive for new antimicrobial production, including
introducing longer antibiotic patents.40 The Infectious Diseases Society
of America has suggested extensive patent changes without much
relevant analysis of the interaction between patent law and antibiotic
markets. Much more sophisticated analysis has come from the
Extending the Cure report issued in 2007 by Anup Malani and Ramanan
Laxminarayan under the auspices of the think tank Resources for the
Future.41
This focus on intellectual property rights is certainly
understandable given the value of patents to pharmaceutical
innovation,42 but Sector 2 is just one of six possible solution spaces for
continued antibiotic effectiveness. In recent years, some authors have
explored prize-based R&D approaches (Sector 6) with a range of quite
remarkable proposals. Two of the most innovative thinkers in this area
are James Love and Tim Hubbard,43 and many other scholars are
working on prize-related approaches to pharmaceutical innovation
generally, including law professors Terry Fisher and Talha Syed,
philosopher Thomas Pogge, and economist Aiden Hollis.44 Antibiotic
39 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005).
40 BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 4-5 (supporting patent extensions, wildcard patents, and other
patent and tax-based incentives to promote antimicrobial development); LAXMINARAYAN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 9-10 (listing patent modifications as potential policy options to incentive new
antimicrobial development and discussing conservation); Spellberg, Antibiotic Resistance, supra
note 9; Spellberg et al., Societal Costs Versus Savings, supra note 9; George H. Talbot et al., Bad
Bugs Need Drugs: An Update on the Development Pipeline from the Antimicrobial Availability
Task Force of the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES
657, 666 (2006) (supporting legislation proposed in Congress with the support of the Infectious
Disease Society of America). But see Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at
561-62 (criticizing the wild-card patent proposal); Outterson, Antibiotic Resistance, supra note 9.
41 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 7.
42 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 37.
43 James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New Medicines,
82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519 (2007); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for
Global Healthcare R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 147 (2004); James Love, Prizes, Not Prices, to
Stimulate Antibiotic R&D, SCIENCE & DEV. NETWORK, Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.scidev.net/
en/health/antibiotic-resistance/opinions/prizes-not-prices-to-stimulate-antibiotic-r-d-.html.
But
see Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act
of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25 (2007); Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, Patents
and R&D Incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade Framework for Financing
Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (June 25, 2004), http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/
Submission3.pdf.
44 For book-length treatments of prize proposals, see WILLIAM W. FISHER, III & TALHA
SYED, DRUGS, LAW, AND THE HEALTH CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://www.tfisher.org/Drugs%20Contents.htm (selected chapters); AIDEN HOLLIS &
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prizes might be offered for novel first-in-class drugs with powerful
mechanisms against resistance or for antibiotics targeting specific
resistance pathogens for which the drug pipeline appears to be
inadequate.45 Another possible antibiotic prize mechanism would
purchase the patent rights to a novel antibiotic, holding the drug in a
“Strategic Antibiotic Reserve.”46 The drug would not be marketed, and
saved for only the most urgent cases, until such time as resistance to
other drugs made it necessary to resort to the reserved drug.47
In Sector 3, the medical literature is quite extensive on antibiotic
conservation programs,48 but the legal scholarship is much thinner. A
recent effort by Richard Saver admirably moves these Sector 3 issues
forward, with a strong emphasis on the role of physicians in managing
the demand for antibiotics.49 Physicians often exhibit agency problems
when their desire to make money conflicts with the best treatments for
their patients; with antibiotics, an additional problem arises because the
best course of treatment for a particular patient might impose a small
but cumulatively significant cost on society through resistance.50
THOMAS POGGE, INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL HEALTH, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW
MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL (2008); MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER,
STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED
DISEASES (2004); see also William W. Fisher & Talha Syed, Global Justice in Health Care:
Developing Drugs for the Developing World, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 581 (2007); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights: A Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the
Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRITISH MED. J. 1279 (2006). The economic and health
policy literature is also significant. See, e.g., Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward
Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 MILBANK QUARTERLY 213 (1995);
Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. &
ECON. 525 (2001); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and
Research Contracts, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983); Aiden Hollis, An Efficient Reward System
for Pharmaceutical Innovation (Jan. 17, 2005), http://econ.ucalgary.ca/fac-files/ah/drugprizes.pdf.
For a more philosophical approach, see Thomas Pogge, Harnessing the Power of Pharmaceutical
Innovation, in THE POWER OF PILLS: SOCIAL, ETHICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DRUG
DEVELOPMENT, MARKETING, AND PRICING 142 (Jillian Claire Cohen et al. eds., 2006).
45 For a list of likely pathogens for such a prize, see Louis B. Rice, Federal Funding for the
Study of Antimicrobial Resistance in Nosocomial Pathogens: No ESKAPE, 197 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1079 (2008).
46 The analogy is to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, an idea I floated in 2005 and fleshed out
in 2007. Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 100 (“Postponing discovery of
new antibiotics might be the best course so long as the present drugs are better managed.”); id. at
116 (“Possible market-making techniques include patent buyouts, prizes, strategic stockpiles, and
contractual purchase commitments.”); Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at
564 (not using the term, but calling for paying patent owners to hold important antibiotics “offmarket as a conservation plan”); see also Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 9. Bill Sage
and David Hyman are also beginning to discuss this idea, see Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 21,
and other researchers may have used similar terms as well.
47 For a discussion of vancomycin as an accidental model for the Strategic Antibiotic
Reserve, see infra Part IV.C.
48 For a recent review of the medical literature, see Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30,
at 6-7.
49 Saver, supra note 35 (emphasizing physician demand-side conservation issues).
50 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 6-11 (discussing physician agency issues).
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This brings us to Sector 1, the intersection of conservation and
property rights. Some Sector 1 models look to patent law to solve
antibiotic conservation problems. An obvious solution would be to
patent technologies that promote antibiotic conservation, such as rapid
diagnostic tests that would permit a physician to specifically diagnose
an infection in the office. The physician could then prescribe the
appropriate antibiotic for the specific infection, or, if the infection was
not bacterial, avoid an unnecessary prescription altogether. Another
example is a catheter with patented anti-bacterial properties. Avoiding
hospital-associated infections with improved catheters would reduce
demand for antibiotics.
A more adventurous Sector 1 idea is to expand antibiotic patent
rights as a conservation tool, allowing patent owners to more fully
control the use of their products.51 The basic proposal is to expand
private property rights in antibiotics in order to promote conservation,
resolving the tragedy of the antibiotic commons through enclosure and
private ordering. Beginning in 2005, Eric Kades52 suggested that
patent-based property rights in antibiotic innovation lead to wasteful
overuse as patent expirations approach.53 He called for much longer
patent terms in order to give the patent holder a long-term perspective
on the antibiotic patent.54 Later that same year, I analogized this
situation to the ancient tort of waste, a classic temptation as a timelimited property right nears expiration.55 We built upon prior work of
economists and others working on patent-based incentives relating to
antibiotic conservation.56 In general, this work has been theoretical
51 It appears that Kades introduced this concept to the legal literature. Kades, supra note 4, at
635-43, 653-59; see also LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 20; Carolyn Fischer, Does the
Monopolist Care About Resistance?, in BATTLING RESISTANCE TO ANTIBIOTICS AND
PESTICIDES: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 288-92 (Ramanan Laxminarayan ed., 2003) [hereinafter
BATTLING RESISTANCE]; John B. Horowitz & H. Brian Moehring, How Property Rights and
Patents Affect Antibiotic Resistance, 13 HEALTH ECON. 575, 577-78 (2004); Ramanan
Laxminarayan, How Broad Should the Scope of Antibiotic Patents Be?, 84 AM. J.
AGRICULTURAL ECON. 1287 (2002) [hereinafter Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents];
Douglas Noonan, An Economic Model of a Genetic Resistance Commons: Effects of Market
Structure Applied to Biotechnology in Agriculture, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra, at 263-87;
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 80.
52 Kades, supra note 4.
53 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 12; Kades, supra note 4, at 629-38.
54 Kades, supra note 4, at 653-59. Success of the patent extension strategy as a conservation
device would require drug companies to value future sales over present sales. If the discount rate
was high (as in an inflationary economy), present sales would be strongly preferred. Even in
normal economic times, future sales must be discounted. Therefore, as a conservation measure,
patent extension will be least valuable in the early years of marketing an antibiotic, and more
valuable if added when the patent faced immanent expiration. The effect on resistance is
unknown.
55 Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 81-86; see also Outterson et al.,
Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563.
56 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 9-10, 12-13; Cars et al., supra note 35; Fischer,
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rather than empirical. In two recent articles, I offered some anecdotal
examples that might be considered evidence of the “patent holder
waste” hypothesis,57 but hard data was lacking. This Article is the first
to test these emerging theories with empirical data from an important
hospital-based antibiotic—vancomycin.
C.

Hypotheses Concerning Antibiotic Production and Conservation

Generally speaking, knowledge is non-excludible (inappropriable)
and nonrivalrous (inexhaustible); patent law seeks to solve the free-rider
problem by awarding market exclusivity to the patent holder. Patent
disclosure publicizes useful knowledge, and a patent’s expiration makes
such knowledge fully available to the public domain. Since knowledge
is generally not rivalrous, temporary exclusive use does not diminish the
public domain.
Antibiotics depart from the general case because antibiotic
innovation is potentially exhaustible (rivalrous). Antibiotic innovation
is exhaustible when use creates resistance and resistance degrades
utility. I have reviewed the literature and discussed these questions at
length in prior articles,58 but will briefly highlight seven important
hypotheses that relate to these questions and place them in the context
of the six sectors in Table 2 infra. Since these hypotheses are being
proffered collectively for the first time, this Part is primarily descriptive.

supra note 51; Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 51; Ramanan Laxminarayan, Introduction: On
the Economics of Resistance, in BATTLING RESISTANCE, supra note 51, at 9; Laxminarayan,
Scope of Antibiotic Patents, supra note 51; Stéphane Mechoulan, Market Structure and
Communicable Diseases, 40 CAN. J. ECON. 468 (2007); Noonan, supra note 51; Tomas J.
Philipson & Stéphane Mechoulan, Intellectual Property and External Consumptive Effects:
Generalizations from Pharmaceutical Markets 9, 13-14 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9598, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9598.pdf?new_
window=1 (arguing that optimal patent life is infinite if the good creates negative externalities,
citing antibiotic resistance as one example). These authors also draw on two older articles. See
Gardner Brown & David F. Layton, Resistance Economics: Social Cost and the Evolution of
Antibiotic Resistance, 1 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 349, 351 (1996); Clem Tisdell, Exploitation of
Techniques That Decline in Effectiveness with Use, 37 PUB. FIN. 428, 436 (1982).
57 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563. For a description of the
“patent holder waste” hypothesis, see infra Part II.C.
58 Id.; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 76-78.
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Table 2. Hypotheses From Legal and Economic Theory on
Continued Antibiotic Effectiveness
Hypothesis
H1.
H2.
H3.
H4.
H5.
H6.
H7.

Patent holder waste
Patent holder conservation
Patent incentives are inadequate for production
Resistance stimulates innovation
Conservation dampens production
Excessive regulation dampens production
Antibiotic externalities are predominantly negative

Sector
1
1
2
2
3
4
All

The first two hypotheses—patent holder waste (H1) and patent
holder conservation (H2)—are important foundations for propertybased conservation efforts in Sector 1. The third and fourth
hypotheses—patent incentives are inadequate for production (H3) and
resistance stimulates innovation (H4)—relate to the production of novel
antibiotic therapies in Sector 2. H5—conservation dampens
production—evaluates the impact of Sector 3 conservation initiatives on
the production of new antibiotics. H6—excessive regulation dampens
production—evaluates the impact of regulatory changes in Sector 4 on
the production of new drugs. H7 does not fit neatly into any particular
Sector, but has important implications for several areas. The following
Part explores each hypothesis in more depth.
Both economists and lawyers have suggested that expansions in
patent law might encourage appropriate conservation of antibiotics.59
Two hypotheses arise from this literature: patent holder waste (H1), and
a related concept, patent holder conservation (H2).60 Patent holder
waste (H1) suggests that when companies hold time-limited property
rights, they lack financial incentives to manage the antibiotic for the
long-term public health. Facing patent expiration in a few years, a
company might zealously market the drug, leading to premature
resistance.61 The remaining costs of that resistance are externalized
when the patent expires.62
59
60

See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
The term “waste” is taken from the Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 1, ch. 5 (1278).
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 81-86; Outterson et al., Antimicrobial
Patents, supra note 4, at 563.
61 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 20; Fischer, supra note 51; Noonan, supra note
51; Horowitz & Moehring, supra note 51, at 578-80; Kades, supra note 4, at 635-43;
Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents, supra note 51; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain,
supra note 4, at 80.
62 This is a simplification in at least two ways. First, expiration of the patent is not a bright
line moment for generic entry, as companies generally litigate generic entry and may have
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Patent holder conservation (H2) is a related claim, suggesting that
if patent holders were given longer and broader patent rights, they could
manage resistance more efficiently. The classic analogy is the
enclosure of the commons from Hardin’s seminal article in Science.63
Although they are related claims, patent holder waste (H1) and patent
holder conservation (H2) should be distinguished because the empirical
data for each proposition may diverge. For example, H1 predicts that
patent owners will aggressively market antibiotics during the last few
years of patent life. H2 makes a different claim—that if granted longer
patents, the companies would manage antibiotic use for the long term.
These propositions are logically distinct. If companies always sell to
the extent the market will bear, then H1 may be true while H2 will be
false. Put another way, H1 describes a potential problem while H2 is a
possible solution.
A simplified example illustrates the difficulties with patent holder
conservation. Assume that a patented antibiotic yields $100 million in
sales per year, with ten years left in the patent term. With a discount
(inflation) rate of five percent, the net present value of the expected
income stream is approximately $772 million.64 If additional marketing
could add ten percent per year to net revenues, the company’s net
present value jumps by $413 million to $1.185 billion.65 In this
simplified example, conservation will not generate positive economic
results for the company unless incremental resistance would have
destroyed about thirty-five percent of the net present value sales during
the patent period.66 These calculations are very sensitive to the major
assumptions: the discount (inflation) rate,67 the increase in sales that
could be achieved with unchecked marketing, and the response rate of
resistance. Therefore, patent holder conservation depends upon both the
effectiveness of advertising to change discretionary sales, as well as the
effect of those marginal sales upon resistance during the patent period.
These hypotheses are theoretical predictions that should be
empirically tested. For example, real-world changes in drug firm
marketing behavior near the end of the patent term raise difficult
questions for H1. Patent-based drug companies generally reduce their
multiple patents on a product or use. Second, branded sales do not automatically cease upon
patent expiration. In both cases, the patent holder waste hypothesis is weakened in that the
assumption of a time-limited property right is empirically disproven, or at least made significantly
more complex.
63 Hardin, supra note 5, at 1243-48.
64 Net present value calculation made at Investopedia New Present Value Calculator,
http://www.investopedia.com/calculator/NetPresentValue.aspx?viewed=1
(assuming
$100
million in revenues each year for ten years with a five percent discount rate).
65 Id. (assuming a five percent discount rate and a ten percent increase in sales each year, i.e.,
$100 million in year 1, $110 million in year 2, $121 million in year 3, etc.).
66 $413 is 34.9% of $1185.
67 Higher discount rates make antibiotic conservation less attractive to companies.
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marketing expenses several years in advance of patent expiration,
perhaps due to the time lag between marketing investments and
resulting drug sales.68 To avoid creating positive externalities for
generic rivals, the patent-based drug companies generally reduce
marketing in the last few years of the patent.69 This is exactly the
opposite of the behavior predicted by patent holder waste (H1).
Furthermore, after patent expiry, neither generic companies nor the
former patent holder engage in much marketing,70 suggesting that losing
patent protection might actually reduce waste through less intensive
marketing. Lichtenberg and Duflos find prescription drug utilization to
be relatively flat after patent expiration, despite the entry of much
cheaper generics. They hypothesize that the price effect and marketing
effect roughly cancel one another out.71 If this result holds true for
antibiotics, then both the patent-holder waste (H1) and patent-holder
conservation (H2) hypotheses suffer a direct empirical challenge.
The third hypothesis (patent incentives are inadequate for
antibiotic production) is rooted in the relatively short treatment course72
and low reimbursement rates for most antibiotics.73 It is said that
antibiotic markets remain inappropriately small compared to their health
benefits.74 This is another way of saying that the patent owner captures
an inadequate percentage of the social welfare surplus created by the
antibiotic. Absent attractive markets, companies will not invest
appropriately in antibiotic R&D. Many methods could be employed to
augment revenues during the patent term, including tax incentives

68 FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & GAUTIER DUFLOS, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE FOR MEDICAL
RESEARCH, TIME RELEASE: THE EFFECT OF PATENT EXPIRATION ON U.S. DRUG PRICES,
MARKETING, AND UTILIZATION BY THE PUBLIC (2009), http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/mpr_11.htm.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. (“The two hypothesized effects of increased competition from generics—increased
utilization due to falling prices, and decreased utilization due to reduced marketing—appear
approximately to offset each other. . . . [T]he number of free samples declined sharply after
patent expiration . . . .”). Their data was virtually all prescription drugs sold in the United States
during 2000-2004, not just antibiotics.
72 J.H. Powers, Antimicrobial Drug Development—The Past, the Present, and the Future, 10
CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION 23, 26 (2004) (“Finally, many antimicrobials are
prescribed for treatment durations ranging from a single dose to 10 days of treatment. This shortterm use limits the potential profitability of antibacterial drugs compared to other classes of
drugs.”); Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 8. While this maxim is oft-repeated, there is no
inherent reason why reimbursement must be tied to length of treatment. Several recent biological
drugs, especially in oncology, have prices in excess of $20,000 despite a short course of
treatment. See, e.g., Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life Worth: Cetuximab, NonSmall Cell Lung Cancer, and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1044
(2009). The problem is actually the reimbursement model, not the length of treatment.
73 See infra Part III.C.
74 Steven J. Projan, Why Is Big Pharma Getting Out of Antibacterial Drug Discovery?,
6 CURRENT OPINION IN MICROBIOLOGY 427, 427-28 (2003); Wenzel, supra note 2.
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(Sector 4) and improved reimbursement (Sector 5), but longer patent
terms are most frequently proposed as an additional incentive for
antibiotic production. This view has many champions, including a wellknown drug company representative;75 the Infectious Diseases Society
of America;76 an intergovernmental conference in Europe;77 and other
leading infectious disease experts.78 Others advance this claim in
narrower circumstances. Ben Roin has argued that pharmaceutical
patent incentives are particularly weak for obvious uses of existing
drugs.79 Roin calls for new periods of data exclusivity rather than
longer patents.80
Fourth, resistance makes existing antibiotic drugs obsolete over
time, creating market opportunities for new drugs.81 To the extent that
competition with existing drugs discourages market entry by a new
drug,82 resistance clears the field and facilitates introduction of new
drugs. This is the resistance stimulates innovation hypothesis (H4).
Resistance also encourages the production of antibiotics with novel
features. Examples include new drug classes that bypass existing
resistance mechanisms, such as ketolides,83 glycylcyclines,84 and some
75
76

Projan, supra note 74, at 429-30.
BAD BUGS, supra note 10; Brad Spellberg et al., Trends in Antimicrobial Drug
Development: Implications for the Future, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1279 (2004);
Talbot et al., supra note 40.
77 Roger Finch & Pamela A. Hunter, Antibiotic Resistance—Action to Promote New
Technologies: Report of an EU Intergovernmental Conference Held in Birmingham, U.K., 12-13
December 2005, 58 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY (SUPP. S1) i3 (2006).
78 S. Ragnar Norrby, Carl Erik Nord & Roger Finch, Lack of Development of New
Antimicrobial Drugs: A Potential Serious Threat to Public Health, 5 LANCET INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 115 (2005); Wenzel, supra note 2; Barry Eisenstein, Editorial, Antibiotic Research:
The Kryptonite of Superbugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2009, at 9 (calling for longer antibiotic
patent periods; Eisenstein is the Senior Vice President of Scientific Affairs at Cubist
Pharmaceuticals).
79 Data exclusivity hinders FDA approval by generic companies, and hence delays market
entry. The general effect is somewhat similar to patents, but the legal mechanism is different.
See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX. L. REV.
503, 567 (2009).
80 Id. But see Kevin Outterson, Death from the Public Domain?, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 45
(2009),
http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/volume-87/roin/death-from-the-public-domain.html
(critiquing Roin’s positions).
81 See infra Part III.A.
82 Powers, supra note 72, at 25-26 (“There are several reasons why antibacterials may be at a
competitive disadvantage relative to other drugs. There is a high level of competition with drugs
already on the market. As shown above, there are a number of agents within various classes still
available. While resistance is an emerging problem in a relative sense, the majority of infectious
diseases in terms of absolute numbers in the USA are still caused by susceptible pathogens.”).
83 C.E. Nord, D.J. Farrell & R. Leclercq, Impact of Ketolides on Resistance Selection and
Ecological Effects During Treatment for Respiratory Tract Infections, 10 MICROBIAL DRUG
RESISTANCE 255, 257 (2004) (“Overall, these findings suggest that ketolides may have a lower
potential to select for resistance than existing MLS antibacterials, a factor that will be
advantageous in terms of preserving their long-term utility.”); see also Grit Ackermann & Arne
C. Rodloff, Drugs of the 21st Century: Telithromycin (HMR 3647)—The First Ketolide, 51 J.
ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 497, 506 (2003) (“[T]elithromycin did not lead to Clostridium
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other antibiotics.85 This second innovation effect is not limited to drugs,
but includes innovation in complementary products such as diagnostic
tests and conservation techniques.
Fifth, effective conservation measures will dampen the demand for
antibiotics and therefore reduce the incentive to develop new ones.86
Efforts to reduce unnecessary use of antibiotics necessarily impair the
market for these products, reducing unit sales.87 This is the
conservation dampens production hypothesis (H5). But it is not clear
whether H5 is a bad thing if the goal is healthy people rather than just
more drugs. Conservation prevents infections, which is even better than
successfully treating them.
Sixth, according to some drug companies, the FDA imposes
unreasonable regulatory burdens prior to marketing approval that are
particularly difficult to overcome for antibiotics.88 These regulations
are said to increase the expense of clinical trials, delay market entry, and
generally discourage antibiotic production. This is the excessive
regulation dampens production hypothesis (H6):
The main reason why industry has left the field of antibiotic research
and development is the poor return on investment owing to
increasing costs of drug development, caused, in part, by increasing
demands from regulatory authorities, and stricter pricing controls
imposed by many governments.89

difficile colonization.”).
84 Gary E. Stein & William A. Craig, Tigecycline: A Critical Analysis, 43 CLINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 518, 518 (2006) (“[Tigecycline] overcome[s] the 2 major mechanisms of
tetracycline resistance: tetracycline-specific efflux pump acquisition and ribosomal protection.”).
85 David L. Paterson, Clinical Experience with Recently Approved Antibiotics, 6 CURRENT
OPINION PHARMACOLOGY 486 (2006) (“Pharmaceutical companies recognized the threat of
increasing antibiotic resistance in organisms such as enterococci and staphylococci. Several new
compounds were developed with activity against vancomycin-resistant enterococci and
vancomycin-resistance S. aureus.”).
86 Kades, supra note 4, at 656; Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 100,
119; Brad Spellberg et al., The Epidemic of Antibiotic-Resistant Infections: A Call to Action for
the Medical Community from the Infectious Diseases Society of America, 46 CLINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 155, 158 (2008).
87 Norrby, supra note 78, at 117 (“Another problem for pharmaceutical companies is that the
indications for which antibiotics are prescribed most commonly are now being questioned. The
best examples are acute bronchitis, acute exacerbations of acute bronchitis, acute sinusitis, and
acute otitis media, indications for which drastically reduced use is now advocated.”); Powers,
supra note 72, at 26 (“[C]linicians see the appropriate public health need to preserve older
antimicrobial agents through judicious use, that is, not prescribing antibacterials to patients who
do not have a bacterial infection. . . . Experts often also recommend reserving new agents for
patients who may have disease caused by resistant pathogens, limiting the potential use of a new
drug.”).
88 See, e.g., Projan, supra note 74, at 429.
89 Norrby, supra note 78, at 116-19 (suggesting relaxation of regulatory requirements in
antibiotic clinical testing). But see Powers, supra note 72 at 26 (“However, there are no increased
regulatory hurdles for antimicrobials, or specifically antibacterials, compared with other
therapeutic classes.”).
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Finally, much of the legal and economic literature describes
externalities from antibiotic use as predominantly negative (H7). The
classic example is inappropriate use of an antibiotic by a patient with a
viral upper respiratory infection, which threatens the public with
resistant infections.90 In this archetype, the doctor and patient both have
inappropriate reasons to use the antibiotic despite the lack of medical
need (antibiotics are ineffective against viruses). Society bears the costs
of both resistance and inappropriate drug expenditures.
The medical literature describes these relationships with more
complexity and subtlety.91 In addition to negative externalities, the
patient may be harmed directly (an internalized cost). Receiving
antibiotics may expose the patient to significant personal risk. One
mechanism is Clostridium difficile-associated disease (CDAD), which is
a severe and sometimes life-threatening diarrheal disease triggered by
antibiotic use (i.e., a nosocomial disease).92 A second personal cost is
promoting resistance in commensal bacteria in the patient’s body.93
Prior antibiotic use is a risk factor for infection by drug-resistant
bacteria such as MRSA, increasing the relative risk by a factor of 2.1.94
When certain antibiotics are used, the relative risk of MRSA is almost
three times greater.95 Similar results have been found for resistant
pneumococci after the use of oral cephalosporins and penicillins, with
each drug resulting in quite different patterns of resistance and
susceptibility.96 Twenty-five percent of patients receiving fourteen-day
treatments of ciprofloxacin developed resistance to nalidixic acid or
ciprofloxacin that was not detected before therapy began.97 One third of

90
91

See, e.g., Kades, supra note 4, at 626-27.
See, e.g., Marc Lipsitch & Matthew H. Samore, Antimicrobial Use and Antimicrobial
Resistance: A Population Perspective, 8 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 347 (2002); see also
Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 4-5 (collecting sources); Outterson, Vanishing Public
Domain, supra note 4, at 104-09.
92 R.C. Owens, Jr. et al., Antimicrobial-Associated Risk Factors for Clostridium difficile
Infections, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S19 (2008); see also infra Part IV.B.
93 Bruno Fantin et al., Ciprofloxacin Dosage and Emergence of Resistance in Human
Commensal Bacteria, 200 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 390 (2009) (finding that ciprofloxacin use
may select for resistance in commensal non-pathogenic bacteria).
94 Evelina Tacconelli et al., Does Antibiotic Exposure Increase the Risk of MethicillinResistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) Isolation? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 61
J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 26, 32 (2008). “This meta-analysis shows a clear
association between exposure to antibiotics and MRSA isolation.” Id. at 26.
95 Id. at 33 (“This risk is almost three times greater after the use of quinolones and
glycopeptides.”).
96 Matthew H. Samore et al., Mechanisms by Which Antibiotics Promote Dissemination of
Resistant Pneumococci in Human Populations, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 160, 166 (2006) (“The
results of this study support the hypothesis that distinct antimicrobial classes promote
pneumococcal resistance by different mechanisms.”).
97 Fantin et al., supra note 93, at 395.
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these patients developed resistance to levofloxacin during ciprofloxacin
therapy.98 Antibiotics can directly harm some patients.
Information deficits also play a role. Even if the patient is directly
harmed, the negative effect is not truly “internalized” if patients and
physicians are not aware of the existence and magnitude of the damage.
This situation is akin to a factory that is not aware that it is polluting or
that the pollution is damaging its own property. Even with low
transaction costs, optimal solutions require accurate knowledge.
In addition, some resistance externalities may be positive. Search
and destroy infection control techniques in hospitals and long-term care
facilities can reduce the spread of MRSA in a facility, but they also
create positive externalities for competing facilities in the community
when the patient is discharged.99 Discharging only non-carriers makes
infection control easier and cheaper for competitors within the same
epidemiological “germ-shed.”100
Finally, some antibiotics and patients display heterogeneous
externality profiles. Some company-sponsored studies suggest that
ketolides may inflict less ecological damage than some other
antibiotics.101 Some antibiotics are associated with higher risks of
MRSA.102 For some important infections (tuberculosis, HIV, influenza
and Group A streptococci), treatment itself is a major tool for
preventing transmission of susceptible strains. Negative resistance
externalities might also be weighed differently if the patient is an
African child with a high fever in a low-resource setting. All of these
factors add to the complexity of the analysis. Any attempt to optimize
antibiotic conservation and production incentives should understand the
ecosystem prior to intervention. The next Part explores these contextual
elements.

98
99

Id.
Put another way, transferring MRSA carriers to nursing homes or community hospitals, or
discharging them to the community, imposes uncompensated external costs on competitors.
100 A “germ-shed” is roughly analogous to a watershed: regions that are epidemiologically
interdependent and thus share positive and negative infectious disease externalities. Kevin
Outterson, Germ-Sheds (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Sage & Hyman, supra
note 3, at 34.
101 Nord et al., supra note 83, at 255 (“Thus, it is prudent to evaluate the likely ecologic
impact of new antibacterial agents—and their potential to select for resistance—before they are
widely introduced into clinical practice.”); id. at 257 (“Overall, these findings suggest that
ketolides may have a lower potential to select for resistance than existing MLS antibacterials, a
factor that will be advantageous in terms of preserving their long-term utility.”); see also
Ackermann & Rodloff, supra note 83, at 506 (“[T]elithromycin did not lead to Clostridium
difficile colonization.”).
102 Tacconelli et al., supra note 94, at 33 (“This risk is almost three times greater after the use
of quinolones and glycopeptides.”).
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III. THE ECOLOGY OF RESISTANCE AND INNOVATION
Legal and economic models tend to oversimplify the biology of
antibiotic resistance. The relationships are heterogeneous and complex,
as are most ecological systems.103 As Marc Lipsitch notes: “[T]he scale
of the problem, and the rate at which resistance becomes a problem, is
highly variable, depending on the antimicrobial agent, the pathogen and
the setting in which transmission occurs.”104 For example, while
resistance to penicillin is widespread for some bacterial species,105
group A streptococci remain fully susceptible to penicillin after many
decades of intensive use.106 For other drugs and species, limited
resistance emerged almost immediately.107
Resistance is not limited by the boundaries of a single patent
application. Resistance frequently occurs across different drugs within
a class,108 and a few forms of resistance (some efflux systems and
permeability changes) apply across multiple classes. In a recent clinical
trial, treatment of healthy volunteers with a fourteen-day regime of
ciprofloxacin triggered resistance to other members of the quinolone
and fluoroquinolone class, including nalidixic acid and levofloxacin.109
Resistance can also be transmitted across bacterial species.110
Resistance within classes and between classes differs by both pathogen

103
104
105

Lipsitch, supra note 1.
Id. at 438.
CDC’s Role in Monitoring and Preventing Antimicrobial Resistance: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong. 2 (June 24, 2008) (statement
of Fred C. Tenover, Dir., Office of Antimicrobial Resistance, Center for Disease Control and
Prevention) [hereinafter CDC’s Role Hearing] (“To provide a sense of the problem, unpublished
data from CDC’s National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance System indicate that [more than
ninety percent] of strains of Staphylococcus aureus, a bacterial species that causes a spectrum of
illnesses from minor skin infections to serious life-threatening diseases, are no longer treatable
with penicillin, while one third of Streptococcus pneumoniae isolates, a common cause of ear
infections, pneumonia, and meningitis, are also no longer treatable with penicillin.”).
106 Symposium, Why Have Group A Streptococci Remained Susceptible to Penicillin?, 26
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1341 (1998).
107 See, e.g., Ellie Hershberger et al., Quinupristin-Dalfopristin Resistance in Gram-Positive
Bacteria: Mechanism of Resistance and Epidemiology, 38 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92
(2004) (finding that resistance emerged not long after regulatory approval).
108 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99 (collecting sources).
109 Fantin et al., supra note 93, at 395; see also David C. Hooper, Emerging Mechanisms of
Fluoroquinolone Resistance, 7 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 337 (2001) (describing the
mechanisms of fluoroquinolone resistance, including the role of transmission and selection in
reservoir populations).
110 Cesar A. Arias & Barbara E. Murray, Antibiotic-Resistant Bugs in the 21st Century—A
Clinical Super-Challenge, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 439, 443 (2009) (“Moreover, the common
presence of these β-lactamase genes of gram-negative bacteria in transferable mobile elements
means that these genes could reach virtually any gram-negative bacterium and become a major
threat in the future.”).
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and drug,111 so the relationships are complex and subject to revision as
the biology becomes better known.
Many of the models for resistance mistakenly assume that
resistance occurs primarily through single point mutations, based on the
example of tuberculosis. If the avoidance of single point mutations is
the goal, then policy makers will insist on preventing suboptimal dosing
or premature suspension of antibiotic therapy. For this reason, patients
are often told to complete the full course of antibiotics. But single point
mutation is rare in some drug-bug combinations, meaning that this
advice may be counterproductive in some cases. Resistance to some
drugs is acquired only through complex exchanges of genetic material,
and the novel strains thereby created may gain an advantage in
transmitting to other hosts for many reasons other than treatment of the
infection of interest with the drug of interest.112 Such mechanisms of
indirect selection for resistant strains may include treatment of patients
who do not suffer from the organism of interest but who harbor it on
their bodies, or treatment with other antibiotics (besides the one of
interest) to which the same strains happen to be resistant.113 For these
patients, a completely different strategy might be appropriate, including
early cessation of antibiotic therapy.114
Several examples from Lipsitch and Samore illustrate other
potential models for acquisition of a resistant infection, focusing on a
population perspective rather than simply a single patient. First, if a
hospital ward is already colonized with resistant bacteria, treating a
patient with an antibiotic as a surgical prophylactic (preventative
treatment) might clear an ecological niche for the rapid growth of
resistant infections like MRSA in the patient.115 Second, patients may
enter the hospital colonized with both susceptible and resistant species;
treatment with an antibiotic clears the susceptible species and may
111 See, e.g., Richard J. Ryan, Chris Lindsell & Paul Sheehan, Fluoroquinolone Resistance
During 2000-2005: An Observational Study, 8 BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 71 (2008)
(associating empiric use of moxifloxacin, a fluoroquinolone marketed as Avelox®, with increased
resistance by Gram negative bacteria; use of other tested fluoroquinolones (ciprofloxacin,
levofloxacin, and gatifloxacin) was associated with a decrease in resistance by Gram negative
organisms).
112 Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 91 (describing four models of antimicrobial resistance).
113 Hooper, supra note 109, at 339 (“Thus, for all three organisms in which fluoroquinolone
resistance has become problematic despite a requirement for multiple mutations, other
epidemiologic factors (of transmission and ongoing selection in reservoir populations of
organisms) appear to be at work.”).
114 A study is underway in the Netherlands to test prospectively whether a common fourteenday antibiotic course of treatment can be shortened to seven days. Cees van Nieuwkoop et al.,
Treatment Duration of Febrile Urinary Tract Infection (FUTIRST trial): A Randomized PlaceboControlled Multicenter Trial Comparing Short (7 Days) Antibiotic Treatment with Conventional
Treatment (14 Days), 9 BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES 131 (2009).
115 Lipsitch & Samore, supra note 91, at 349 (describing four models of antimicrobial
resistance).
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induce growth in the resistant bacteria.116 Finally, if the bacterial
population within an individual includes a mixture of resistant and
susceptible bacteria, as is often the case, treatment will increase the
burden of resistant bacteria in the treated person and the risk of
transmission of these bacteria, increasing the chance of infection with
resistant species, even to people who were never treated.117 The
common theme of these mechanisms is that none of them requires the
new appearance of a resistant strain within a treated individual, but
rather all rely on the indirect effects of treatment, frequently creating
negative externalities. Legal and economic studies of antibiotic
resistance should not ignore these indirect treatment effect externalities.
Simplistic models of resistance miss too much biological
complexity. We should expect no less heterogeneity and complexity
when we introduce legal variables. The conclusions we draw about
appropriate policy responses to resistance may need to be carefully
tailored to the complex ecology of drug-bug interactions. Legal and
economic models have an uncanny penchant for simplifying
assumptions, but the relationship between resistance and innovation
should not be among them. Normal legal arguments supporting
innovation and new drug production may not apply to antibiotics, and
antibiotic conservation may yield unique social welfare gains that might
not otherwise be expected.
The following three sub-Parts explore these contextual issues in
depth: (A) innovation in the face of resistance; (B) balancing
conservation and production; and (C) the role of insurance
reimbursement.
A.

Resistance May Promote Innovation

The conventional wisdom is that resistance undermines antibiotic
innovation. Fear of resistance may discourage companies from
introducing new antibiotics into the market.118 This Part directly
challenges this proposition. Resistance may plausibly affect innovation
through three mechanisms: (1) clearing out competitor drugs; (2)
affecting sales during the patent period; and (3) steering innovation
towards novel classes.

116
117
118

Id.
Id.
Projan, supra note 74, at 428.
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Resistance Facilitates Competitive Entry

Resistance facilitates market entry by destroying competing drugs
and thereby creating new markets for antibiotic drugs.119 The U.S. Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) approves drugs based upon their safety
and effectiveness. For most drugs, effectiveness is a static
determination.120 Approved drugs can lose relative effectiveness over
time as better drugs enter the market, but this is simply the natural effect
of competition and innovation. Antibiotics are not immune to this
competitive dynamic, but they suffer an additional market threat as
resistance erodes the absolute effectiveness of the drug. Resistance
destroys existing antibiotics by rendering them absolutely less effective
over time. Penicillin and methicillin were excellent antibiotics and
would have retained greater market share but for resistance, which
paved the way for subsequent less desirable blockbuster drugs like
ciprofloxacin, erythromycin, levofloxacin, and vancomycin. These
follow-on drugs would have faced more difficult competition absent
resistance, which diminished both the relative and, more importantly,
the absolute effectiveness of penicillin and methicillin.
2.

Resistance Does Not Appear to Significantly Harm Sales During
the Patent Term

Patent-based drug companies face a disincentive only if resistance
appears at commercially significant levels during the patent term.
Begin with the assumption that that economically significant resistance
occurs no earlier than patent expiration.121 If so, then resistance does
not undermine patent-based incentives for innovation. This is an
119 An early version of this was offered by David Shlaes in 2003: “Resistance creates markets;
use creates resistance.” David M. Shlaes, The Abandonment of Antibacterials: Why and
Wherefore?, 3 CURRENT OPINION IN PHARMACOLOGY 470, 471 fig.1 (2003); see also
Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 7 (noting that firms are targeting the MRSA market);
THE GLOBAL ANTIBACTERIALS MARKET: R&D PIPELINES, MARKET ANALYSIS AND
COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPES (Arrowhead Publishers, 2007) (“The global anti-infective market is
currently valued at US$66.5 billion with antibacterial agents accounting for over [fifty percent] of
sales. The antibacterial market is set to grow to over US$45.0 billion by 2012, driven by the
uptake of newer antibacterial agents . . .”).
120 The FDA evaluates safety and efficacy, not comparative effectiveness. The U.S. Congress
recently funded some comparative effectiveness research but did not change the FDA approval
process. Paige Goodwin & Kevin Outterson, Editorial, From Comparative Effectiveness to Cost
Effectiveness?, 14 PHARMA PRICING & REIMBURSEMENT 126 (2009).
121 To be precise, I mean the earlier of patent expiration per the FDA Orange Book or the date
of first generic entry in the United States. This date sets the baseline period of marketing
exclusivity that the company should reasonably expect from U.S. patent law.
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important point: When economically significant resistance is delayed
until after patent expiry, the drug company receives the full economic
benefit of the patent period.122 The company may also benefit from
resistance that reduces competition from prior drugs. A myriad of other
factors might interrupt the commercial plans of the drug company, but
premature resistance would not be among them.123 This assumption, if
true, would mean that the relationship between resistance and
innovation held a positive sign: Increased resistance would increase
innovation.124
As noted above, this second point rests on the assumption that
economically significant resistance does not occur during the patent
term. This assumption can be empirically tested. One method would be
to compare sales data for leading antibiotics with their patent expiration
dates. A recent study identified the top ten hospital antibiotics, by days
of therapy per 1,000 patient-days.125 The following analysis looks at
these ten hospital antibiotics. Proprietary sales data from IMS Health
establish that all of these leading antibiotics were still generating
significant sales after generic entry.126 Four of these drugs (cefazolin,
metronidazole, vancomycin, and clindamycin) have been off patent for
at least a decade, and yet still sell in sufficient volume to make the top
ten list. For vancomycin and metronidazole, sales actually accelerated
after patent expiration, as will be discussed in Part IV infra. Only
levofloxacin remained on patent in early 2009, with expiration due in
2010; gatifloxacin was removed from the U.S. market in 2006 for safety
concerns, but sold well up to that point. The four remaining antibiotics
on the list have recently experienced patent expiration, which permits us

122 The question of ex post experiences and ex ante projections of resistance will be discussed
shortly.
123 For a discussion of these other factors, see Projan, supra note 74; S.J. Projan & D.M.
Shlaes, Antibacterial Drug Discovery: Is It All Downhill from Here?, 10 CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY & INFECTION (SUPP. 4) 18 (2004).
124 In this simple model, resistance reduces the existing stock of generic competitors and does
not harm the innovator molecule until after patent expiration. Both signs are positive for the
production of innovative new antibiotics.
125 Conan MacDougall & Ronald E. Polk, Variability in Rates of Use of Antibacterials Among
130 US Hospitals and Risk-Adjustment Models for Interhospital Comparison, 29 INFECTION
CONTROL & HOSPITAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 203, 206 (2008). The top ten hospital antibiotics in these
U.S. hospitals, from August 2002 to July 2003, in descending order, were: levofloxacin,
cefazolin, ceftriaxone, metronidazole, vancomycin, piperacillin-tazobactam, gatifloxacin,
azithromycin, ciprofloxacin and clindamycin. For a similar list, also see Amy L. Pakyz, Conan
MacDougall, Michael Oinonen & Ronald E. Polk, Trends in Antibacterial Use in US Academic
Health Centers: 2002 to 2006, 168 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 2254, 2258 (2008).
126 I chose sales as the relevant metric rather than published reports of resistance, primarily
because the task is to measure the effect of resistance on R&D incentives. Published reports of
resistance to a specific pathogen may affect sales, but other factors (including marketing and
medical need) may nonetheless intervene to drive overall sales. Measuring sales directly seems
the most accurate method.
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to observe U.S. sales in the five years prior to generic entry. Chart 1
presents this data.
Chart 1. U.S. Sales (in Millions of Constant Year -5 Dollars) in the
Five Years Prior to Generic Entry127

Resistance does not appear to have significantly undercut sales for
the patent holders at the end of the terms,128 although we do not know
the counterfactual (i.e., what sales would have been absent any
resistance). We are also unable to measure the effect of reduced
marketing in the last years of patent life. Nevertheless, it would be
difficult to conclude that resistance was economically significant during
the patent term for these drugs.129
The data on Zithromax® (azithromycin) and Cipro®
(ciprofloxacin) deserve special mention. One might be tempted to see
evidence of H1 patent holder waste in the last full year of the core

127 Proprietary data from IMS Health Inc. MIDAS™ database, 1997-2007 (Antibiotics ATC
Level 4, J1C1, MNF YTD Oct. 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter IMS Data]. This data
includes all branded forms of Recephin® (ceftriaxone), Zosyn® (piperacillin-tazobactam),
Zithromax® (azithromycin), and Cipro® (ciprofloxacin). Since the data covers different years
for each antibiotic, a uniform annual deflator of 2.9% was applied; this was the average
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) for 2002-2006.
128 These conclusions are tentative, for antibiotic sales also fluctuate with cycles of infectious
disease and other exogenous factors unrelated to resistance. I have not adjusted the data for the
overall level of infections in a given year.
129 The simplified example suggested that relatively high levels of commercially significant
resistance would be required in order to make conservation economically desirable for the patent
holder. See supra notes 64-67. The data sample in this Part may have a significant selection bias,
as it is comprised of only the most successful antibiotics, which will not include antibiotics
decimated by resistance. A possible response is that some antibiotics are more vulnerable to
resistance than others, and since the goal is population health, we should focus on the antibiotics
most used in the population. These issues deserve more attention.
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Zithromax® patent,130 but, despite significant levels of resistance,131
unit sales of azithromycin remained strong in 2009. Pfizer may have
aggressively marketed Zithromax® (the evidence is not clear), but it is
harder to prove that waste resulted.
The spike in Cipro® (ciprofloxacin) sales in Year-2 includes sales
generated by the anthrax scare in the United States following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent mailing of
several packages containing anthrax spores in October 2001. The
decline in the following year may reflect regression to the mean. In any
case, the decline in 2002 has little to do with resistance, as ciprofloxacin
retains significant sales in the United States even today.132
A second way to approach this question would be to identify the
date when an antibiotic encountered resistance sufficient to decimate
sales, and then compare that date with patent expiry. Such examples are
difficult to identify. Very high levels of resistance may be necessary
before sales are damaged. Azithromycin resistance levels in the United
States have declined slightly from 31% in 2000 to 28.9% 2004,133 and
yet U.S. sales remain robust and growing, with the sales of the branded
product Zithromax® nearly doubling during the period.134 Indeed,
Zithromax® was the best selling antibiotic on Chart 1, despite high
resistance levels in the years immediately prior to generic entry. High
levels of resistance during the patent term do not necessarily undercut
the patent holder’s return on investment.
An important example of robust sales despite resistance is broadspectrum oral penicillin, the poster child for resistance. Penicillin
enjoyed annualized U.S. sales exceeding $1.38 billion in 2004,
confirming that sales remain strong many decades after introduction,
despite the presence of penicillin-resistant bacteria.135 In June 2008, the
Director of the CDC Office of Antimicrobial Resistance testified before
Congress that certain tested strains of Staphylococcus aureas were
“[ninety percent] resistant to penicillin.”136 Apparently, ninety percent
resistance to Staphylococcus aureus does not foreclose a major
commercial U.S. antibiotic market. Resistance levels differ widely
across different bug-drug combinations. Physicians are prescribing
130 The core Zithromax® patent expired in November 2005. Pfizer Inc. Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 9 (Mar. 1, 2006).
131 Stephen G. Jenkins, Steven D. Brown & David J. Farrell, Trends in Antibacterial
Resistance Among Streptococcus pneumoniae Isolated in the USA: Update from PROTEKT US
YEARS 1-4, 7 ANNALS CLINICAL MICROBIOLOGY & ANTIMICROBIALS 1, 4 tbl.2 (2008).
132 In addition, the generic entry of ciprofloxacin was highly litigated, which may be a
complicating factor. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
133 Jenkins et al., supra note 131.
134 IMS Data, supra note 127.
135 IMS Data, supra note 127.
136 CDC’s Role Hearing, supra note 105.
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penicillin for other pathogens, such as group A streptococci.137 In any
event, penicillin continues to be a blockbuster drug, even at generic
pricing, despite high resistance levels for some bacteria.
A final example of sales despite some resistance is levofloxacin,
the most-used hospital antibiotic and the most recent member of the
“top 10” list138 to be approaching patent expiration.139 Recent clinical
articles describe levofloxacin as a highly desirable antibiotic without
widespread resistance to commercially significant pathogens.140 In
short, it does not appear that clinically important hospital antibiotics
have been economically weakened through resistance during their
patent terms.141
3.

Resistance Drives Companies Toward More Innovative Products

Any fear of resistance during the patent term skews R&D towards
antibiotic projects that are less likely to suffer early resistance. In early
stage testing of new antimicrobial compounds, researchers evaluate
likely resistance profiles. Compounds for which resistance could be
easily achieved are likely to be set aside early in the R&D process.142
The fear of economically significant resistance may generate social
welfare gains by directing research towards novel antibiotics with
stronger resistance profiles rather than me-too extensions of existing
classes. Private losses are possible here if research into novel classes is
uniquely more expensive. But private gains are also plausible, if novel
antibiotics are more able to attract venture capital, licensing, and
eventual clinical sales.

137
138
139

Why Have Group A Streptococci Remained Susceptible to Penicillin?, supra note 106.
MacDougall & Polk, supra note 125.
Generic entry for levofloxacin is expected in 2010. See Johnson & Johnson Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 28-29 (Aug. 4, 2009) (discussing litigation in 2009 to delay approval of
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) filed by Lupin); Johnson & Johnson Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 20, 2009) (disclosing that levofloxacin patent expires on Dec. 20,
2010).
140 V.R. Anderson & C.M. Perry, Levofloxacin: A Review of Its Use as a High-Dose, ShortCourse Treatment for Bacterial Infection, 68 DRUGS 535 (2008); David Felmingham, Rafael
Canton & Stephen G. Jenkins, Regional Trends in B-Lactam, Macrolide, Fluoroquinolone and
Telithromycin Resistance Among Streptococcus pneumoniae Isolates 2001-2004, 55 J. INFECTION
111, 113 tbl.1 (2007) (finding levofloxacin resistance to be quite low, around one percent in
2004); Jenkins et al., supra note 133.
141 One objection to this analysis is the failure to consider the ex ante expectations of the
patent owner rather than their ex post experience with resistance. Ex ante projections are more
relevant to the investment decisions of patent owners. The data used in this Article focuses on the
ex post experience as a proxy for expectations.
142 In the author’s experience, many anti-infective biotech companies highlight the resistance
profiles of their compounds at investor conferences.
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To summarize, resistance may plausibly affect innovation through
three mechanisms: (1) clearing out competitor drugs; (2) affecting sales
during the patent period; and (3) steering innovation towards novel
classes. The first proposition appears to be well supported and the
result encourages the production of new drugs, a unique advantage for
antibiotic innovation. The second proposition appears to be
unsupported by the available data, meaning it has little or no effect on
antibiotic innovation. The third is supported by anecdotal evidence
from industry, and may plausibly yield positive private and public
gains, but the definitive exploration of this issue is not undertaken in
this Article.
With these caveats in mind, resistance appears to have an overall
positive effect on the production of innovative antibiotics. This result
erodes the foundation of claims that antibiotics possess unique qualities
that require additional production incentives, as Sector 2 proponents
often claim. Indeed, the opposite conclusion seems appropriate:
Antibiotics require fewer innovation incentives than other types of
drugs.
B.

Conservation Reduces Demand for New Antibiotics, but May Yield
Overall Social Welfare Gains

One response to resistance is antibiotic conservation, careful
rationing or stewardship of these drugs to prolong clinical effectiveness.
Many antibiotics are overused in clinically improper settings.
Encouraging the rational use of antibiotics is a conservation measure.143
Other Sector 3 conservation measures include public health practices to
reduce the incidence and spread of infectious disease and infection
control in the hospital, clinic, and community.144
Conservation is a sound strategy for reducing resistance, but these
efforts appear to work at cross-purposes with incentives to produce
novel antibiotics. Conservation efforts, if successful, necessarily reduce
the unit sales of antibiotics, which is the central idea in H5—
conservation dampens production. Antibiotic stewardship and rational
use programs can be considered anti-marketing campaigns. Infection
control efforts, if successful, reduce the spread of dangerous infections
and reduce the need for antibiotic treatments.
Conservation also prolongs the clinical usefulness of existing
products, which makes competitive entry more difficult. It seems clear
143 LEVY, supra note 30. Rational use also has other benefits: lower costs, fewer significant
side effects, and fewer interactions with other drugs.
144 Saver, supra note 35, at 431 (emphasizing the need to focus on physician demand-side
issues that drive antibiotic misuse).
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that Sector 3 (public health conservation) is in tension with Sector 2
(production of new drugs). As shown in Part III.A.2 supra, the threat of
commercially significant resistance emerging during the patent term is
modest. The same cannot be said for the commercial threats of national
conservation programs, which may be funded by governments and
reduce unit sales significantly.145 Drug companies should not fear the
effect of resistance on their cash flows, but should be greatly concerned
about well-funded Sector 3 conservation programs.
In normal pharmaceutical markets, reducing the flow of innovative
new products might be considered negative. In every other disease
category, society should celebrate the arrival of improved therapies. In
antibiotic markets, this might not be true. If existing antibiotic therapies
remain effective, we do not yet need new ones. Remember that the goal
is continued antibiotic effectiveness, not new drugs per se. If patients
receive effective treatment, or better yet, avoid infection in the first
instance, then the social welfare goals have been met.
Furthermore, the case for innovation presupposes that new drugs
are better than old ones. This assumption is not uniformly true.146 If a
new drug is no better than the old, then the health gains from innovation
are zero. From a societal perspective, the net effect is negative, due to
the expense of R&D. If a new drug is not better and entails unknown
safety risks, then innovation results in an even greater social welfare
loss. Since resistance degrades the absolute efficacy of established
antibiotics over time, it may be easier to show that a new antibiotic is
medically superior to the then-available alternatives. Social planners—
145 See, e.g., Elifsu Sabuncu et al., Significant Reduction of Antibiotic Use in the Community
After a Nationwide Campaign in France, 2002-2007, PLOS MED., June 2, 2009,
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000084
(studying a French national campaign over six years that resulted in a 26.5% reduction in the
number of antibiotic prescriptions); Benedikt Huttner & Stephan Harbarth, “Antibiotics Are Not
Automatic Anymore”—The French National Campaign to Cut Antibiotic Overuse, PLOS MED.,
June 2, 2009, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.
1000080 (noting that said campaign cost €500 million).
146 See, e.g., Margaret Gilhooley, Drug Preemption and the Need to Reform the FDA
Consultation Process, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 539 (2008); Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and
the Need for Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941 (2007) (detailing
the Vioxx safety recall); Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., The Rise and Fall of Natrecor for Congestive
Heart Failure: Implications for Drug Policy, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1095 (2006) (detailing safety
issues with a new drug); Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining
Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308 (2007); Ray Moynihan, Iona Heath & David Henry, Selling Sickness:
The Pharmaceutical Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRITISH MED. J. 886 (2002)
(questioning the medical need for some new drugs); Mary K. Olson, The Risk We Bear: The
Effects of Review Speed and Industry User Fees on New Drug Safety, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 175
(2008) (finding increased safety problems with new drugs approved in an accelerated timeframe);
Michael A. Steinman et al., Characteristics and Impact of Drug Detailing for Gabapentin, PLOS
MED., Apr. 24, 2007, http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.
pmed.0040134 (examining the off label promotion of a drug for indications for which evidence of
efficacy was lacking).
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or a federal comparative effectiveness agency147—should prefer new
therapies that represent substantial clinical improvements, but the FDA
does not require proof of superior efficacy for antibiotics, just safety
and noninferiority.148
But let us assume that a certain new antibiotic is actually a better
drug than existing therapies. It still does not follow that we should
prioritize innovative production at the expense of conservation. Most
new antibiotics carry serious side effect risks, including adverse
reactions, liver toxicity, and other serious risks of organ failure.149 The
properly framed societal choice is not between vancomycin and
penicillin with high levels of resistance, but between vancomycin with
all its dangerous side effects and fully effective penicillin protected by
conservation. Penicillin was the better drug, and conservation of that
better drug would have resulted in a social welfare gain by both
prolonging the usefulness of penicillin and delaying the necessity of
using more dangerous antibiotics. In some European countries,
clinicians have successfully conserved older antibiotics in order to
reduce the need to resort to more dangerous drugs such as
vancomycin.150
Finally, experts suggest that the low-hanging fruit in antibiotic
research may have been already discovered.151 If true, investments in
antibiotic R&D will yield declining marginal returns. As each new
antibiotic becomes more expensive, the value of conservation rises, if
both are properly priced in the market. In Part III.C.1 infra, I
demonstrate that they are not. In energy policy, we see a significant
relationship between increased energy prices and the demand for
conservation and renewable energy technologies. If antibiotic markets
are a similar exhaustible resource, then from a societal perspective,
147 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 111-4, 123 Stat.
115 (allocating funding for comparative effectiveness research); see also Goodwin & Outterson,
supra note 120.
148 Clinical drug trials include a treatment arm and a control arm, generally using a placebo.
In antibiotic trials, placebos are considered unethical, and therefore the control arm utilizes an
antibiotic that is the standard of care. The treatment arm must show noninferiority to the control
arm. Brad Spellberg and others at the IDSA suggest that the noninferiority standard should be
weakened to approximate a placebo-controlled trial conducted in a pre-antibiotic era. Brad
Spellberg et al., Antimicrobial Agents for Complicated Skin and Skin-Structure Infections:
Justification of Noninferiority Margins in the Absence of Placebo-Controlled Trials, 49 CLINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 383 (2009); Dennis L. Stevens, Editorial, Antimicrobial Agents for
Complicated Skin and Skin-Structure Infections: Noninferiority Margins, Placebo-Controlled
Trials, and the Complexity of Clinical Trials, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 392 (2009).
This proposal would make it easier to achieve FDA approval for efficacy.
149 For example, vancomycin, a major hospital antibiotic, replaced methicillin for treatment of
MRSA despite significant limitations including poor tissue penetration and potential liver
toxicity. Marin H. Kollef, Limitations of Vancomycin in the Management of Resistant
Staphylococcal Infections, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S191 (2007).
150 Personal communication with Ursula Theuretzbacher (on file with author).
151 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 77, and sources cited therein.
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conservation should be an increasingly important policy element, in
contrast to new production. Of course, conservation is never fully
effective over time, so even the most robust conservation program must
also be paired with some new production of antibiotics.
C.

Insurance Reimbursement Significantly Influences Resistance and
Conservation

The third contextual issue is money: Insurance reimbursement for
antibiotics affects innovation and conservation in dramatic ways. For
all the ink spilt on intellectual property issues, relatively little has been
said about reimbursement for antibiotic conservation.152 This is a major
weakness of the existing literature, as reimbursement systems may
prove to be of equal or greater importance to many of the institutions
and people directing antibiotic use.
On the question of pharmaceutical innovation, much of the
literature tinkers with the patent system; but in a world of government
insurance programs, reimbursement changes can have a much more
direct and powerful effect on company revenues.153 The patent-based
drug industry recently announced an $80 billion “contribution” to the
Obama health care reform efforts, including changes in Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement.154 As Bill Sage and David Hyman put it,
federal reimbursement “offers the longest lever for altering antibiotic
usage and infection control patterns.”155 Few patent policy levers are of
this magnitude and immanence; for a best-selling antibiotic, even a
substantial extension to the patent term would increase the net present
value of cash flows by a modest amount.156 By contrast, changes in
152 Two notable exceptions are LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, especially at ch. 3 and
ch. 6, and Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28.
153 Prescription Drugs—An Overview of Approaches to Negotiate Drug Prices Used by Other
Countries and U.S. Private Payers and Federal Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of John Dicken, Dir., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07358t.pdf [hereinafter Prescription Drugs]; U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD
COUNTRIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. CONSUMERS, PRICING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
AND INNOVATION (2004), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf
[hereinafter PRICE CONTROLS] (discussing the large impact that European drug pricing
reimbursement systems have on drug companies); Drug Importation: Would the Price Be Right?
Hearing Before the S. Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement of Kevin Outterson), [hereinafter Drug Importation] (offering a critique of the U.S.
Department of Commerce study).
154 Laura Meckler & Alicia Mundy, For Drug Makers, Concessions Have a Bright Side,
WALL ST. J., June 23, 2009, at A4.
155 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28.
156 See Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 562 (calculating the net present
value of patent term extensions for antibiotics).
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hospital, physician, and prescription drug reimbursement currently
being discussed in Congress could shift tens of billions of dollars
immediately.157
While drug patents are undeniably valuable to the pharmaceutical
companies, their impact on the other institutional players in the U.S.
health care sector is limited. For providers such as hospitals and
physicians, reimbursement systems such as Medicare, Medicaid, and
private insurance company reimbursement are much more important.158
Similarly, patients are little affected by antibiotic drug patents as long as
they are insured,159 but the structure of the insurance reimbursement
system directly affects the financial incentives presented to patients
regarding antibiotic therapy.160 Just as bacteria live in complex
ecological systems, principals and agents in the U.S. health care sector
inhabit a space populated with powerful institutions that should not be
ignored in theoretical models. In the following Parts, we will examine
the impact of reimbursement on incentives for drug companies,
providers (hospitals, physicians), and patients. My claim is that many
elements of reimbursement affect antibiotic resistance in complex
patterns.
1.

Drug Company Reimbursement

The first example of reimbursement complexity is the amount paid
to drug companies for their products.161 Patent law theorists are
especially fond of market-based price signals for patented products
because the market sets the value of the patent. If a patented product
does not draw much consumer interest, the patent owner will either
adjust the price or accept smaller unit sales. If the product is wildly
successful, the magnitude of market demand directly affects the patentbased profits that are collected. In theory, the market for patented
products thus rewards products in proportion to consumer demand in
the market, an important advantage over other methods that may lack a
market test.
157 1 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS: HEALTH CARE (2008), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9925/12-18-HealthOptions.pdf.
158 Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 28.
159 On a static basis, patents increase the cost of all health care and thus the social cost of
insurance, but this effect does not specifically alter antibiotic incentives. On a dynamic basis,
theory suggests that health care innovation may raise quality and lower costs, but it is hard to find
empirical support for this in the expensive, innovative, and mixed quality environment of the U.S.
health sector.
160 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, ch. 3 (discussing the role of insurance on antibiotic
resistance).
161 See, e.g., PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 153; Drug Importation, supra note 153;
Prescription Drugs, supra note 153.
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But the market does not set pharmaceutical prices in high-income
countries, including the United States.162 U.S. drug reimbursement
prices are negotiated through a complex process with significant
government intervention benefiting specific payors.163 Favored payors
include Medicaid,164 the Veterans’ Administration (VA),165 and public
health clinics under § 340b.166 The current Medicare law prohibits the
government from negotiating drug prices on behalf of private Medicare
Part D plans.167 A professed goal of the Democratic leadership in
Congress is to reverse this ban, which might result in near-monopsony
(oligopsony) purchasing power by Medicare as a purchaser.168
Even private pharmaceutical reimbursement markets contain an
interesting mixture of near-monopsony and competition. Many health
plans subcontract their prescription drug plans to a small number of
pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs). Three PBMs dominate the
market,169 and one of these large PBMs (Caremark) was recently
purchased by CVS, a large drug store chain.170 This market structure
limits price negotiations to a small number of participants.
Many factors affect the outcome of these negotiations, especially
efforts to influence agents acting on behalf of the patient. If a drug is
generic with many bioequivalent competitors, PBMs can negotiate quite
low reimbursement rates in a fairly competitive market. If the drug is
both important medically and has no good substitutes, the drug
company wields significant market power in setting prices. An

162 See PRICE CONTROLS, supra note 153 (discussing the large impact that European drug
pricing reimbursement systems have on drug companies); Prescription Drugs, supra note 153.
163 Kevin Outterson & Aaron S. Kesselheim, How Medicare Could Get Better Prices on
Prescription Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. w832 (2009) (web exclusive).
164 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8 (2006) (outlining mandatory and supplemental Medicaid drug rebate
programs).
165 Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-585, §§ 601, 603, 106 Stat. 4943 (limiting
prices for prescription drugs purchased by the VA and certain other federal agencies); id. at § 602
(referencing the 340B program under the Public Health Service Act); 38 U.S.C. § 8126 (2006).
166 42 U.S.C. § 256b (2006) (codifying section 340B of the Public Health Service Act); GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: EXPANDING ACCESS TO FEDERAL PRICES
COULD CAUSE OTHER PRICE CHANGES (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/
he00118.pdf. Section 340B also applies to other special categories of favored providers,
including certain disproportionate share hospitals, urban Indiana health centers, and other
specified providers serving special populations. See U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, HRSA—340B Drug Pricing
Program/Pharmacy Affairs, http://www.hrsa.gov/opa/introduction.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
167 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, sec. 101(a)(2), § 1395w-111, 117 Stat. 2066, 2092-99 (codified as 42 USC § 1395w111(i) (2006)); see Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 163.
168 Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 163.
169 Medco Health Solutions, Inc., Express Scripts, Inc., and CVS Caremark Corporation are
the largest. Some large health plans and retail pharmacy chains have PBM capabilities in-house.
CVS Caremark Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8, 21 (Feb. 27 2008).
170 Id. at 3. The acquisition closed on March 22, 2007. Id.
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intermediate case is a drug with possible substitutes,171 especially if the
PBMs can credibly threaten to refuse to purchase the drug. This creates
a potential conflict between the medical needs of the patient and the
financial goals of the PBM and the insurance company. One role of
direct-to-consumer advertising and physician detailing (personal
marketing by drug companies) is to diminish the latitude of PBMs in
this situation by driving consumer and physician demand for a
particular drug. PBMs react by creating restrictive formularies,172 with
tiered copays for different types of drugs,173 but they must consider
consumer and provider preferences when creating and enforcing a
formulary.174 Drug companies give financial support to some patient
advocacy groups and deploy the groups to fight formulary restrictions
and increased copays, frequently without disclosing the conflicts of
interest.175 Some drug companies have responded to copay increases
for branded drugs by issuing coupons, which may distort patients’
perceived cost of such drugs.176 Drug companies also engage in offlabel marketing, expanding sales into conditions lacking FDA
approval.177
More broadly, many commentators are concerned with the
mismatch between reimbursement and medical need—consumer
demand builds markets for drugs with modest population health impact,
while companies fail to mount impressive R&D programs for many
important diseases. This problem has three foundations.

171 Substitutions may come within a drug class, or substitutions from other therapies such as
surgery.
172 A formulary is a list of drugs that a health plan will cover. Formularies may impose
restrictions on more expensive drugs, including higher co-payments or multiple tiers of copayments. For example, a formulary might impose a $0 co-pay on generic drugs, a $15 co-pay on
preferred drugs, and a $50 co-pay on non-preferred drugs.
173 Prescription Drugs—Overview of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spending in
Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the
District of Columbia of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, Gov’t Accountability Office), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09819t.pdf.
174 Agency costs are present in the PBM relationship as well. PBMs serve as agents of the
consumer when negotiating access and prices, but they have their own interests as well, which
may be in conflict. National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Pricing, Pharmacy
Benefit Managers Policy Background, http://www.reducedrugprices.org/pbm_policy.asp (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010) (detailing potential conflicts of interest regarding PBMs).
175 H. Marcy Bortner, Conflicted Advocates: Pharmaceutical Companies’ Funding of Patient
Advocacy Groups: Report to the West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council (Apr.
6, 2005) (unpublished report, on file with author); Tinker Ready, Divided Loyalties?: Nonprofit
Health Advocacy Groups Like to Portray Themselves as Patients’ Allies; Can They Serve
Corporate Benefactors at the Same Time?, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at F1.
176 Chana Joffe-Walt, Drug Coupons Hide True Costs from Consumers, NPR, Oct. 20, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=113969968.
177 Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use—Rethinking the Role of the FDA, 358
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427 (2008).
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First, global medical need and wealth are not equally distributed or
correlated. In fact, the very opposite characterizes our world.178 For
this reason, pharmaceutical companies develop ever-lengthening lists of
drugs for the lifestyles of wealthy consumers in high-income countries,
while devoting relatively little to treating diseases particular to the
poor.179 This disparity is less salient within high-income countries with
comprehensive health insurance programs that cover pharmaceuticals.
The second foundation is the problem of information asymmetries
regarding pharmaceuticals. Consumers are not well informed about the
risks and benefits of prescription drugs, including antibiotics. Even
physicians are overwhelmed by the flood of peer-reviewed literature
and end up relying to some extent on intermediaries such as drug
marketers. These informational asymmetries are present for other
consumer products as well, but the stakes are higher and the process is
different for drugs. If we are talking about toasters or coffee shops,
revealed consumer preferences may be a fine methodology for
allocating goods and services in the market; we may feel differently for
antibiotics with the potential for both internal and external harm from
either using too much or too little, and the potential for a collapse in a
common pool resource.
Some view direct-to-consumer (DTC) marketing as a remedy to
this information gap;180 others consider DTC marketing a corporate tool
that exploits information asymmetries, creating false demand for cures
to spurious diseases.181 DTC advertising is not widely used for
antibiotics in the United States at the present time.182
Finally, agency costs introduce distortions into consumer
pharmaceutical markets.183 The patient must rely on a physician to
decide how and when to prescribe. In general, agency costs include
shirking and self-dealing. Shirking in this context would include a lazy
178
179

Pogge, supra note 44.
Kevin Outterson, Should Access to Medicines and TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited to
Specific Diseases?, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 279 (2008).
180 See Peter J. Pitts, Turning Point or Tipping Point: New FDA Draft Guidances and the
Future of DTC Advertising, 23 HEALTH AFF. w259 (2004) (web exclusive). But see Matthew F.
Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: A Haphazard Approach to Health Promotion, 293
JAMA 2030 (2005).
181 See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE
US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS,
RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2005); RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS,
SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING
US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2006); Matthew Perrone, Disease May Not Be Real, but the Drug Profits
Are, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, at A4.
182 West Virginia Pharmaceutical Cost Management Council Direct to Consumer Advertising
Data, CY2008 (on file with author) (reporting no DTC expenditures for any antibiotic).
183 Despite concerns about physician agency costs, most observers still appear to prefer that
antibiotics be sold through physician agency in the form of a prescription as opposed to over-thecounter.

OUTTERSON.31-3

650

1/28/2010 6:09:35 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

decision to prescribe, without adequately considering all of the potential
factors in this patient’s case. Self-dealing would include direct or
indirect financial rewards that come from prescribing. Both are present
in antibiotic markets.184 One legal mechanism to address self-dealing in
health care is the Stark II law. The theory behind Stark II is that
physicians cannot be trusted to refer to an entity if they stand to gain
financially from the transaction. Outpatient prescriptions are
“designated health services” (DHS) under Stark II, and physicians are
prohibited from making a referral for DHS if they have a financial
relationship with the entity receiving the referral. Writing a prescription
is a referral for Stark II purposes. Federal law thus effectively prohibits
prescribing physicians from having financial interests in pharmacies
located in their office buildings, out of fear that the physicians will be
tempted to over prescribe in order to capture additional pharmacy
sales.185 Federal law considers agency costs in prescriptions to be quite
significant. Reimbursement systems and the rules policing improper
utilization should also be designed with agency costs in mind, with the
knowledge that prescriptions might be influenced by considerations
other than the patient’s health.186
The health insurance market is a network of relationships rife with
potential agency costs. The health plan sponsor (frequently an
employer, association, or government entity) is an agent acting on
behalf of the patient, but it may make cost saving decisions adverse to
the patient’s health.187 PBMs are themselves agents of the health plans,
but have been troubled by conflict-of-interest allegations when taking
secret discounts from drug companies to promote certain drugs.188 Even
184
185
186

Saver, supra note 35, at 431.
42 U.S.C. §1395nn (2006).
LAWRENCE P. CASALINO, PHYSICIAN SELF-REFERRAL AND PHYSICIAN-OWNED
SPECIALTY FACILITIES 18 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Research Synthesis Report No. 15,
2008) (finding agency cost issues in physician self-referral in specialty facilities and
recommending changes in reimbursement and legal changes to address the problem); GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICARE PART B IMAGING SERVICES: RAPID SPENDING GROWTH
AND SHIFT TO PHYSICIAN OFFICES INDICATE NEED FOR CMS TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08452.pdf
(discussing agency cost issues in Part B); MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION,
REPORT TO CONGRESS: PHYSICIAN-OWNED SPECIALTY HOSPITALS (2005) (discussing agency
costs in physician-owned hospitals).
187 To a significant degree, the recent history of managed care is the struggle over agency
costs. For a summary of the backlash against managed care, see Alain C. Enthoven, Helen H.
Schauffler & Sara McMenamin, Consumer Choice and the Managed Care Backlash, 27 AM. J.L.
& MED. 1 (2001).
188 See Christy A. Rentmeester & Robert I. Garis, Rebates and Spreads: Pharmacy Benefit
Management Practices and Corporate Citizenship, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 943 (2008);
Allison Dabbs Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit
Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 33 (2007); Greg Radinsky, The Spotlight on PBMs:
Federal Enforcement of the Anti-Kickback Statute on the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management
Industry, 36 J. HEALTH L. 213 (2003).
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patients do not act solely as principals, since insurance subsidizes drug
spending at the point of care, increasing both appropriate and
inappropriate purchases.189 This effect is magnified by direct-toconsumer advertising in the United States, boosting consumer demand
for a product reimbursed by insurance.190 While these agency costs
have many effects, an important one is dilution of the effectiveness of
the price mechanism. Pharmaceutical reimbursement in the United
States should not be confused with market-based pricing.
The macroeconomic effect of non-market pricing could result in
drug price levels that are either super- or sub-optimal from a social
perspective.191 Antibiotics are a significant drug market, ranked as the
third most profitable class of drugs in 2004.192 Nevertheless, a leading
company researcher suggests that antibiotic reimbursement is suboptimal. Steve Projan suggests that three factors uniquely disfavor
antibiotic reimbursement: (1) conservation reduces unit sales; (2) the
short duration of therapy (two weeks or less, compared to decades for
drugs like Lipitor®); and (3) low prices for antibiotics, driven by both
administered pricing and generic drugs.193 The first factor is a core
element in H5—conservation dampens production. As discussed in Part
III.B supra, conservation reduces unit sales, but it may actually promote
better types of production and yield net overall social welfare gains.
The second and third factors (duration and price) support the argument
that reimbursement is a key driver.
Drug companies could promote better reimbursement models for
antibiotics. Consider the recent introduction of high-priced oncology
drugs. As of 2009, more than ninety percent of the oncology drugs
introduced in the prior four years cost more than $20,000 for a twelveweek course of treatment.194 These prices are defended by studies
demonstrating their cost-effectiveness in terms of quality-adjusted life
years (QALYs) or similar metrics. In another paper, Aaron Kesselheim
and I make the normative claim that if antibiotics generate significant
health returns, they should bear an appropriate price, without regard to
the length of treatment.195 A comparative-effectiveness review of
antibiotics might call for dramatically higher reimbursement to drug

189
190
191
192

See infra Part III.C.3 and sources cited therein.
Id.
Outterson, supra note 39.
Powers, supra note 72, at 25 (“Today, antimicrobials are the third most profitable class of
drugs for pharmaceutical companies, surpassed only by central nervous system and
cardiovascular drugs. The market for antimicrobials is between $26 [billion] and $45 [billion] per
year.”).
193 Projan, supra note 74, at 428; see also BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 17.
194 Fojo & Grady, supra note 72, at 1045 n.17 & tbl.1.
195 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 12-13.
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companies,196 especially if drug companies only capture a small share of
the social welfare generated from antibiotic usage.
If the only concern was production of new antibiotics, greater
reimbursements and subsidies197 might be effective. But conservation
must also be considered. Deploying tax and reimbursement incentives
to make production of antibiotics appear artificially cheap is a serious
error, akin to subsidizing relatively cheap petroleum as supplies
dwindle. If we were to analogize a carbon tax to antibiotics,
government policy might consider making antibiotic production more
expensive.198 And yet, leading groups suggest myriad tax and patent
incentives to reduce the cost of antibiotic production.199 These may be
rational strategies in normal pharmaceutical markets, but may yield
social welfare losses when applied to exhaustible resources like
antibiotics.
2.

Provider Incentives for Hospitals and Physicians

Despite the strong case for conservation and stewardship, many
U.S. academic medical centers do not sustain effective programs.200
One significant factor is reimbursement: Historically, hospitals have had
few economic incentives to invest in antibiotic conservation. Infection
control has generally been an unreimbursed cost,201 even when proven
effective.202 Appropriate use and careful stewardship may drive

196 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 564-65 (“The most market-based
remedy for inadequate innovation is to pay more for outstanding innovation.”).
197 Drug company reimbursement can come through other channels as well.
Some
government policies can be considered indirect reimbursement as they reduce the cost of R&D
and production. Tax incentives, orphan drug credits, and government support for early-stage
research can be considered indirect reimbursement mechanisms as they reduce the cost for
companies to bring products to market.
198 By contrast, Kades proposed making antibiotic consumption rather than production more
expensive. Kades, supra note 4, at 635-52.
199 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10, at 4-5.
200 Pakyz, supra note 125; Richard P. Wenzel, Health Care-Associated Infections: Major
Issues in the Early Years of the 21st Century, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S85, S87
(2007) (“With respect to basic infection control, there needs to be little tolerance for any lack of
hand hygiene. The lack of hygiene compliance is a major failing of modern physicians and other
health care workers that implies both medical and ethical breaches. It cannot be tolerated,
because it is a key quality-of-care issue, and it should be made unacceptable, a part of the annual
review process, and a reason for disciplinary action in hospitals.”).
201 See Kesselheim & Outterson, supra note 30, at 6-7.
202 Susan S. Huang et al., Impact of Routine Intensive Care Unit Surveillance Cultures and
Resultant Barrier Precautions on Hospital-Wide Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus
Bacteremia, 43 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 971 (2006) (finding that routine surveillance for
MRSA in the ICU followed by contact isolation of MRSA cases yielded a large and statistically
significant reduction in MRSA bacteremia).
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unhappy doctors and patients away,203 and infection control programs
are not inexpensive to create and sustain. In fact, hospitals and doctors
have generally gained revenues from additional infections, whether
acquired in the community or the hospital. Most of the economic
incentives do not favor conservation by providers.204
Economic incentives are powerful in hospital reimbursement. In
fiscal year 1983, Congress switched hospitals from cost-based
reimbursement to prospective payment. The program is now called the
inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS).205 IPPS has led to
remarkable changes in the average length of stay and the delivery of
medical services.206 Under IPPS, patients need to be moved out of
hospitals more quickly for financial reasons. These pressures select for
antibiotics, such as linezolid,207 that can be started intravenously and
then switched to oral doses for post-discharge use, creating unknown
effects on resistance.
Reporting infection data is one way to force a hospital to
internalize some of the costs of nosocomial (hospital-associated)
infection. Some states, notably Pennsylvania, require reporting of some
of this data.208 Medicare is also moving in this direction as a condition
for reimbursement.209 Routine testing of patients for MRSA on
admission may also illustrate another negative externality: Hospitals
203
204
205

Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 15; Saver, supra note 35, at 431.
Outterson, supra note 100.
Social Security Act § 1886(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d) (2006). In 1997, Congress created
a special exception for 1100 rural hospitals (called critical access hospitals). MEDICARE
PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS: ISSUES IN A MODERNIZED MEDICARE
PROGRAM ch. 7 (2005), available at http://www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/
June05_ch7.pdf. Critical access hospitals are now exempt from IPPS and are reimbursed on a
cost basis.
206 Jack Ashby, Stuart Guterman & Tim Greene, An Analysis of Hospital Productivity and
Product Change, 19 HEALTH AFF. 197, 202-04 (2000) (discussing the role of Medicare
prospective payment on declining length of stay in hospitals). But see Gerard F. Anderson, Uwe
E. Reinhardt, Peter S. Hussey & Varduhi Petrosyan, It’s the Prices, Stupid: Why the United States
Is So Different from Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89 ex. 5 (2003) (finding U.S. average
length of stay in 2000 to be only slightly below the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD) median).
207 Paterson, supra note 85, at 487 (“The availability of both intravenous and oral formulations
has facilitated switch therapy, whereby intravenous therapy is commenced and oral therapy is
substituted upon hospital discharge.”).
208 See Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council, Hospital-Acquired Infections in
Pennsylvania, http://www.phc4.org/hai (last visited Jan. 15, 2010) (containing interactive
databases of hospital-acquired infections).
209 In the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, Congress offered a “pay for reporting” bonus
to hospitals, paying additional Medicare reimbursement (through the Annual Payment Update or
APU) in exchange for reporting some hospital quality measures, including some hospitalassociated infection data. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. The law was amended through the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5001(a), 120 Stat. 4 (amending section 1886(d)(3)(B) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1395ww(d)(4) (2002)). The first ten hospital quality measures
were proposed for reporting as of November 1, 2003.
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and long-term care facilities with poor records of infection control may
be exporting MRSA to other hospitals, economically damaging the
competition, as discussed in Part II.C supra concerning hypothesis H7
(antibiotic externalities are predominantly negative).
Physicians are also subject to pressures to prescribe antibiotics in
the community, especially empirical (best-guess) therapy while waiting
for a diagnostic test result to confirm bacterial origin. As Richard Saver
has recently described, the cultural, legal, and financial incentives in the
United States support overutilization rather than rational use or
conservation, leading to premature resistance.210 Since physicians write
prescriptions, any plan to socially optimize antibiotic use must
overcome these barriers.
3.

Consumer Pricing Through Insurance

Most U.S. drug purchases are paid through health insurance.
Health insurance changes the price elasticities of prescription drugs,
making them more affordable to the patient at the point of care.
Flattening the price elasticity curve increases consumer demand for
prescription drugs, which, on balance, may be a good thing. But
increased demand can be counterproductive if the drugs are used
inappropriately (wasted); are unsafe for that patient (internal costs); or
contribute to resistance generally (internal and external costs). The
structure of consumer out-of-pocket payments may encourage
inappropriate use. Pricing systems that make antibiotics cheap at the
point of care may stimulate unnecessary demand.211 For example, WalMart’s $4 generics program is problematic if it stimulates inappropriate
overutilization of antibiotics.212 Pharmacies at the Publix grocery chain
announced a rival offer of free generic antibiotics, including
amoxicillin, cephalexin, sulfamethoxazole/trimethoprim, ciprofloxacin,
penicillin, ampicillin, and erythromycin.213 Free antibiotics are the
opposite of Pigovian taxes to correct for antibiotic negative
externalities.214

210
211

Saver, supra note 35, at 431.
LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 69-70 (discussing the policy option of increasing
co-pays to discourage inappropriate antibiotic use).
212 Posting of Sarah Rubenstein to the Wall Street Journal Health Blog,
http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/05/04/wal-mart-tries-to-step-on-pharmacy-benefit-managersturf/ (May 4, 2009, 10:55 EST).
213 Press Release, Publix, Publix Pharmacies Launch Free Prescription Drug Program in All
Operating Areas (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://www.publix.com/about/newsroom/
NewsReleaseItem.do?newsReleaseItemPK=2636.
214 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 80, and sources cited therein;
Sage & Hyman, supra note 3, at 16.
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In summation, this Part III has argued that: (1) resistance
stimulates innovation (H4); (2) conservation should be increasingly
favored over production of new antibiotics with more dangerous side
effect profiles; and (3) insurance reimbursement systems are a key
policy lever for antibiotic effectiveness and may be more effective than
patent law. We now proceed to the case study on vancomycin.
IV. TESTING THE PREDICTIONS: A CASE STUDY OF VANCOMYCIN
Vancomycin is a major antibiotic with a relatively well-developed
literature on resistance.215 A recent study found vancomycin to be the
single most commonly used antibacterial in U.S. hospitals.216 Two
other antibiotics experienced significant increases in utilization during
the study period, namely carbapenems (fifty-nine percent increase) and
piperacillin-tazobactam (eighty-four percent increase).217 Among the
three, only vancomycin was fully off patent and thus directly relevant
for this Article. Accordingly, the focus will be on vancomycin, with
references to other drugs as appropriate.218
A major public health concern is the potential emergence of
vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) and vancomycin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (VRSA).219 A review study on vancomycin
introduced the situation: “Staphylococcus aureus resistance to
vancomycin is one of the greatest concerns in infectious diseases. Over
the past 50 years this common pathogen has demonstrated a remarkable
ability to overcome many classes of antibiotics; however, vancomycin
has largely remained unscathed.”220
This Part IV.A compares the case history of vancomycin with the
seven hypotheses described in Table 2 supra. The biological focus will
be on two major infections treated by vancomycin: Clostridium difficileassociated disease (CDAD) treated with oral vancomycin, and
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) treated with
intravenous vancomycin.221 The institutional focus will be on two
215 A PubMed search for “vancomycin and resistance” yielded 8092 articles, including 1123
review articles. PubMed, http://preview.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
216 Pakyz et al., supra note 126, at 2258.
217 Id.
218 Given the significant increases in utilization of carbapenems and piperacillin-tazobactam,
these examples should be explored in a future study as possible examples of patent holder waste.
219 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10.
220 James S. Lewis II & Michael W. Ellis, Approaches to Serious Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus Infections with Decreased Susceptibility to Vancomycin: Clinical
Significance and Options for Management, 20 CURRENT OPINION INFECTIOUS DISEASES 568
(2007).
221 We will also explore important infections other than MRSA and CDAD in certain contexts,
including VRE.
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actors: drug companies and hospitals.222 We begin by exploring the
market for vancomycin, including its patent history, to uncover the
relationships between resistance, conservation, and production. Part
IV.B then explores some unique questions about antibiotic class
coordination. Part IV.C offers some conclusions regarding the seven
hypotheses.
A.

The Market for Vancomycin

Vancomycin may be a natural experiment in the merits of limited
antibiotic use in a drug’s early years, preserving bacterial susceptibility
(non-resistance) for times of greater clinical necessity. Vancomycin
retains significant clinical effectiveness more than fifty years after its
introduction, due in part to modest sales in its first decades.
Chart 2. U.S. Vancomycin Sales, in Kilograms, 1975-2007223

Vancomycin remains a major antibiotic today, and is often an antibiotic
of last resort. Eli Lilly & Company introduced vancomycin in 1958 to
treat infections no longer susceptible to penicillin.224 Shortly after its
introduction, vancomycin was suspected of various toxicities and was

222 While many studies of antibiotics also focus on community prescription by doctors, Saver,
supra note 35, vancomycin is generally prescribed in hospitals and institutions in the United
States.
223 Data from 1997 to 2007 are from IMS Data, supra note 127 (U.S. R&H, Antibiotics J1X1);
data from 1975-1996 are from Herbert A. Kirst et al., Historical Yearly Usage of Vancomycin, 42
ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1303 (1998).
224 Ruth Brown & Richard Wise, Vancomycin: A Reappraisal, 284 BRITISH MED. J. 1508
(1982).
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quickly overtaken in the market by methicillin and other synthetic
penicillins.225 Limited utilization in the 1960s and 1970s conserved
vancomycin for important uses that emerged in the 1980s and beyond.
In 1982, an article in the British Medical Journal suggested exactly this
linkage: “Probably the high cost and potential toxicity will help to
preserve this very useful agent from abuse, which experience shows
usually leads to resistance emerging—a rare problem as yet with
vancomycin.”226
Note that the successful initial conservation of vancomycin was
largely a medical accident rather than a deliberate patent holder strategy
(compare H2, patent holder conservation).227 The key was
vancomycin’s relative clinical profile during the first two and a half
decades following its introduction in 1958.228 The early preservation of
vancomycin was not due to thoughtful conservation efforts. Guidelines
came much later, beginning in 1995 with the publications by the CDC
and the Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee.229
These guidelines, and others that followed, encouraged clinicians to use
metronidazole as the first-line treatment for CDAD, primarily to slow
resistance to vancomycin.230
Vancomycin’s sales and patent data do not fit the patent holder
waste hypothesis (H1). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued
the first vancomycin patent to Eli Lilly & Company in 1962. During
the patent period, vancomycin was a relatively poor seller. Sales
became significant only after the original patent expired in December
1979.231 From patent expiration until first competitive entry,
vancomycin sales grew as medical needs changed, especially after 1984.
The growing sales of patent-expired vancomycin attracted the attention
of other companies. The first intravenous vancomycin Abbreviated

225 Id.; Donald P. Levine, Vancomycin: A History, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S5
(2006).
226 Brown & Wise, supra note 224, at 1509.
227 Perhaps a major first-in-class antibiotic patent should be purchased in every country and
held in strategic reserve for the protection of future global public health. The analogy is to the
Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The concept of a Strategic Antibiotic Reserve will be explored in a
future article.
228 Patents may have kept the cost higher than substitutable alternatives, but Eli Lilly could
have experimented with pricing elasticities to stimulate demand. Vancomycin’s medical
limitations were the key market constraint.
229 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations for Preventing the Spread
of Vancomycin Resistance: Recommendations of the Hospital Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee (HICPAC), MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (RECOMMENDATIONS
& REP.), Sept. 22, 1995, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/RR/RR4412.pdf.
230 Dale N. Gerding, Metronidazole for Clostridium difficile-Associated Disease—Is It Okay
for Mom?, 40 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1598, 1598 (2005) (reserving oral vancomycin for
“severe, potentially life-threatening cases or when oral metronidazole cannot be used”).
231 Levine, supra note 225, at S7; U.S. Patent No. 3,067,099 (filed Sept. 16, 1955) (issued
Dec. 4, 1962).
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New Drug Application (ANDA) was approved on March 17, 1987,232
nearly eight years after vancomycin’s patent expiration. Another
competitor received five intravenous vancomycin ANDA approvals
from 1988 to 1992.233 While sales continued to grow in the following
decades, the upward trend line was already firmly established prior to
competitive generic entry. Sales leveled off in the mid-1990s,
corresponding with entry of the first oral generic.234 In the last decade,
vancomycin sales have experienced significant growth. As described in
Parts IV.A.1 and IV.A.2 infra, medical need, rather than clever
marketing, drove sales.
Other explanations are possible as well. One could argue that the
upturn in sales after patent expiration was a last-ditch attempt by Eli
Lilly to obtain profits from a disappointing drug. If that was the case,
sales should have spiked prior to expiration, as an example of patent
holder waste (H1). But the sales data in Chart 2 demonstrate relatively
flat sales until 1980, after patent expiration. Another complicating
factor is that patent expiration did not lead to immediate generic
competition in the years prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act.235 Perhaps
patent holder waste is only a problem after Hatch-Waxman, which
suggests a more limited reform to antibiotic patents.
Levine identifies two medical developments explaining the
remarkable growth in vancomycin use in the early 1980s: expansion of
the clinical indications for oral vancomycin against intestinal infections
such as CDAD; and the emergence of MRSA driving demand for
intravenous vancomycin.236 These two environmental changes radically
altered the market for both forms of vancomycin. As described in the
following Parts, vancomycin sales were a response to medical need, not
a marketing or patent story. If so, then vancomycin is not a good
example of patent holder waste (H1).

232 ANDA 062663 (APP Pharmaceuticals); see U.S. Food and Drug Administration,
Drugs@FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm
[hereinafter
Drugs@FDA] (search “Search by Drug Name, Active Ingredient, or Application Number” for
“062663”).
233 ANDAs 062911, 062912, 062931, 062933, and 063076 were filed by Hospira during this
period for injectible vancomycin. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Orange Book Active
Ingredient Search, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/docs/queryai.cfm [hereinafter
U.S. FDA, Orange Book] (search “Search by Active Ingredient” for “vancomycin”).
234 Due to the high cost of oral vancomycin, some physicians administered the intravenous
version orally. Kirst et al., supra note 223.
235 See Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in
International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 215-16
(2005).
236 Levine, supra note 225.
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Oral Use of Vancomycin for CDAD

Vancomycin is not well absorbed in the body. For most infections
it must be given intravenously. For some infections in the intestinal
tract, oral use is appropriate. The FDA has approved oral vancomycin
to treat two intestinal conditions: Clostridium difficile-associated
disease (CDAD), and enterocolitis caused by Staphylococcus aureus,
including methicillin-resistant strains.237 CDAD is a painful, longlasting, and potentially deadly diarrheal disease. Medical expenses
related to CDAD are significant, in the range of $2,400 to $7,100 per
case,238 with over 250,000 cases in 2005.239 The market was worth
$600 million to $1.7 billion in 2005. Today, CDAD remains a billion
dollar business240 and is primarily associated with antibiotic use.241
Prior broad-spectrum antibiotic use dramatically alters the natural
flora in the intestines, permitting more virulent and toxic strains of
Clostridium difficile to flourish in the vacant ecological niche.
Antibiotic use is a frequent cause of CDAD, which makes it a
nosocomial (hospital-associated) infection.242 Oral vancomycin is the
only drug approved by the FDA for the treatment of this condition, but

237 The label for Eli Lilly’s oral vancomycin includes treatment of staphylococcal enterocolitis
and antibiotic-associated pseudomembranous colitis caused by Clostridium difficile. See the
FDA-approved
drug
label
for
Vancocin
HCl
(vancomycin),
available
at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2004/50606slr020_vancocin_lbl.pdf (last
visited Jan. 15, 2010). See also Dale N. Gerding, Is There a Relationship Between VancomycinResistant Enterococcal Infection and Clostridium difficile Infection?, 25 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES S206 (1997); ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Mar. 2, 2006).
238 Erik R. Dubberke et al., Short- and Long-Term Attributable Costs of Clostridium difficileAssociated Disease in Nonsurgical Inpatients, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 497 (2008).
239 L. Clifford McDonald, Confronting Clostridium difficile in Inpatient Health Care
Facilities, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1274 (2007). Only a small portion of these
expenses are for drugs; the largest component is longer hospitalizations and medical services.
240 The patent holder for oritavancin estimates the U.S. cost of nosocomial diarrhea at over
$1.1 billion annually, primarily as a result of increased hospital stays. Targanta Therapeutics,
Pipeline—Oritavancin Program, http://www.targanta.com/pipeline/oritavancin.html (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
241 David B. Blossom & L. Clifford McDonald, The Challenges Posed by Reemerging
Clostridium difficile Infection, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 222 (2007) (noting that
CDAD is a health care-associated disease associated with antibiotic use in the hospital).
242 Gaetano Privitera et al., Prospective Study of Clostridium difficile Intestinal Colonization
and Disease Following Single-Dose Antibiotic Prophylaxis in Surgery, 35 ANTIMICROBIAL
AGENTS AND CHEMOTHERAPY 208 (1991). Oral vancomycin use is also a risk factor for
intestinal fungal infections by Candida species. Ines Zollner-Schwetz et al., Oral and Intestinal
Candida Colonization in Patients Undergoing Hematopoietic Stem-Cell Transplantation, 198 J.
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 150 (2008). Other studies have found similar effects from metronidazole
and ciprofloxacin. Robert Krause et al., Role of Candida in Antibiotic-Associated Diarrhea, 184
J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1065 (2001).
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generic metronidazole is used off-label as the first-line treatment for
CDAD.243
The FDA has approved only two New Drug Applications (NDAs)
for oral forms of vancomycin: Eli Lilly’s Vancocin® and Lederle’s
Vancoled.244 Eli Lilly was the first to market, receiving approval from
the FDA on April 15, 1986.245 Lederle’s oral vancomycin was
approved on October 15, 1993, but sales were disappointing.246 The
bloom was off the rose for oral vancomycin in the mid-1990s as
concerns mounted about vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE). The
volume of medical literature on vancomycin exploded from 1994 to
1997, and hospital clinicians increasingly restricted its use.
Oral vancomycin was historically a relatively small portion of total
vancomycin consumption in the United States,247 but a larger percentage
of the sales revenues due to higher unit prices, peaking at about eighty
percent of the glycopeptide class revenues in FY 1994.248 Eli Lilly’s
oral Vancocin® sales peaked in 1994, declining significantly until
2003.249 The peak in 1994 coincided with published guidelines
suggesting restrictions on the use of oral vancomycin for CDAD in
order to limit the spread of VRE.250 This Sector 3 conservation program
appears to have reduced sales in the 1990s, consistent with H5,
conservation dampens production. Sales in the last decade are shown in
Chart 3:

243
244

ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 2, 2006).
See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancocin” and “vancoled”); U.S. FDA,
Orange Book, supra note 233 (search for “vancomycin”). Eli Lilly transferred the rights to
Vancocin to Baxter Healthcare, which was awarded NDA 050606 on April 15, 1986, and
subsequently to ViroPharma, which received NDA 050671 on April 29, 1993.
245 See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancocin”; follow “VANCOCIN
HYDROCHLORIDE” hyperlink; then follow “NDA #050606” hyperlink; then follow “Approval
History, Letters, Reviews, and Related Documents” hyperlink); Levine, supra note 225, at S7
fig.2. Apparently, some oral consumption occurred prior to approval in 1985.
246 See Drugs@FDA, supra note 232 (search for “vancoled”; follow “ANDA #063321”
hyperlink; then follow “Approval History, Letters, Reviews, and Related Documents” hyperlink);
Levine, supra note 225, at S7 fig.2.
247 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1); see also Kirst et al., supra
note 223, at 1303 (noting that the intravenous version of vancomycin could be given orally as
well); Levine, supra note 225, at S7.
248 IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, FYE Oct. 1994).
249 Id.
250 Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee, Recommendations for
Preventing the Spread of Vancomycin Resistance, 16 INFECTION CONTROL & HOSP.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 105 (1995).
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Chart 3. Oral Vancomycin251 and Oral Metronidazole Sales,252 U.S.
Sales 1993-2007253 (in Thousands of 1997 U.S. Dollars)

The patent holder waste hypothesis (H1) suggests, by analogy, that
competitive market entry by Lederle in 1993 would have resulted in
overzealous marketing and waste.254 That does not seem to have been
the case here. Perhaps Lederle’s timing was poor, but overall constant
dollar sales of oral vancomycin declined from 1993-2003.255 Sales of
Lederle’s oral vancomycin (Vancoled) were very small, less than seven
percent of the glycopeptide class in 1994 and falling rapidly
thereafter.256 Vancoled sales dwindled through the next decade, falling
to $183,000 in 2002 before Lederle discontinued its product.257
The market for oral vancomycin changed dramatically in 2004. Eli
Lilly followed Lederle by exiting the U.S. oral vancomycin market in
November 2004, selling its U.S. rights to ViroPharma for $116 million
251
252

IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, J1X1 Vancocin and Vancoled).
IMS Data, supra note 127 (Antibiotics ATC Level 4, J1C1, Metronidazole G1A1
Trichomonacides and A2B4 Bismuth antiulcerants). Since metronidazole is not approved for
CDAD, it is difficult to know exactly what IMS category is appropriate, but I excluded the topical
uses, leaving primarily tablet forms.
253 Oral metronidazole sales prior to 1997 are not available and have been estimated by the
author. Dollar amounts were adjusted by the author according to the Consumer Price Index: All
Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Consumer Price Index: All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), U.S. City Average,
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
254 See supra Part II.C.
255 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 2004); see also Levine, supra note 225, at S7 fig.2.
256 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 1994).
257 IMS Data, supra note 127 (FYE Oct. 2002).
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cash plus royalties on future sales.258 The royalty structure gave
ViroPharma a strong financial incentive to keep sales above $65
million.259 ViroPharma was remarkably successful, almost doubling the
sales targets in 2005, with net sales exceeding $125 million.260 This
was by far the best sales year in the history of oral vancomycin. In
nominal dollars, sales reached $166.7 million in 2006,261 $203.7 million
in 2007,262 and $232.3 million in 2008, driven by both unit sales and
price increases.263 The dramatic jump in sales of oral vancomycin
certainly looks like patent holder waste (H1) and perhaps also a
negation of patent holder conservation (H2), but on closer examination
the facts do not fit the theory.
Two possible explanations will now be explored for these dramatic
sales figures. The first is a property rights story, driven by aggressive
marketing. The second is a medical story, driven by epidemiological
factors beyond the company’s control.
Certainly the royalty structure gave ViroPharma a strong incentive
to keep sales above $65 million per year. Until October 2008,
ViroPharma was completely dependent on sales of Vancocin®.264
While other products are in development, Vancocin® accounts for one
hundred percent of the company’s current product sales.265 And yet, as
late as December 31, 2006, ViroPharma did not have a sales staff.266
Doctors prescribe Vancocin® primarily in hospitals and long term care
facilities, and a very small marketing staff of six people achieved the
tremendous increase in sales:
We currently have a limited marketing staff and do not have a sales
staff. We focus on educational initiatives, including thought leader
development, physician education, and the targeted education of
health professionals, by utilizing a small number of regional medical

258 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1, 6, 40 (Mar. 15, 2005). ViroPharma
acquired the U.S. rights to Vancocin from Eli Lilly & Company in November 2004. Eli Lilly
retained rights in the rest of the world and continued to produce the active pharmaceutical
ingredient under contract with ViroPharma until 2006. The royalty structure is found on page 40,
and models sales in the range of $44-$65 million per year. Id.
259 ViroPharma paid a fifty percent royalty in 2005 on sales between $44 million and $65
million, but no royalty for sales above or below that corridor. The royalty percentage falls to
thirty-five percent from 2006 to 2011, when it expires. ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 4 (Mar. 2, 2006).
260 Id. at 36 (without adjustment for inflation).
261 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Feb. 28, 2007).
262 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 36 (Feb. 28, 2008).
263 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 47 (Mar. 2, 2009).
264 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 17 (Mar. 2, 2006); ViroPharma Inc.
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 7 (May 4, 2009) (describing acquisition of Lev
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and their drug, Cinryze).
265 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 51 (Mar. 2, 2009).
266 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 28, 2007).
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science liaisons. As of December 31, 2006, we have six members in
our regional medical scientist team.267

In the first quarter of 2008, ViroPharma finally spent $2.7 million
for a hospital sales force to promote Vancocin®.268 By the end of 2008,
these expenses had grown to $12.6 million for the Vancocin® sales
force.269 Sales growth has declined even as marketing expenses have
significantly increased, and the great bulk of sales growth occurred
before any marketing began. Vancocin® is not a marketing-driven
story.
The more likely explanation for this dramatic growth lies in the
CDAD market and growing resistance to metronidazole. Some strains
of Clostridium difficile evolved into a “hypervirulent” pathogen of
growing concern since 2001, driving the demand for therapy.270
Researchers have not yet identified the mutation responsible for this
more dangerous form of Clostridium difficile.271
The primary
alternative to oral vancomycin has been metronidazole, but it faces
increasing treatment failure for this severe form of CDAD.272
Hospitalizations affected by CDAD have grown from 98,000 in 2000 to
an estimated 250,000 in 2005.273 This accounts for the majority of
Vancocin®’s growth274:
Vancocin has been reserved by physicians for patients who have
failed metronidazole therapy, who have relapsed or who are
suffering from severe forms of CDAD. We believe that the
epidemiological shift that has contributed to increased incidence and
severity of CDAD has led to an increase in the use of Vancocin.275

267
268

Id.
ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 8 (Feb. 28, 2008); ViroPharma Inc.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 20 (Apr. 30, 2008).
269 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Mar. 2, 2009).
270 McDonald, supra note 239, at 1274 (noting that the hypervirulent strain of Clostridium
difficile emerged in 2001 when it developed high levels of fluoroquinolone resistance); Dale N.
Gerding, Carlene A. Muto & Robert C. Owens, Jr., Measures to Control and Prevent Clostridium
difficile Infection, 46 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES S43, S43 (2008).
271 Ruth Murray et al., Truncation in the tcdC Region of the Clostridium difficile PathLoc of
Clinical Isolates Does Not Predict Increased Biological Activity of Toxin B or Toxin A, 9 BMC
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 103 (2009).
272 Gerding is quite careful in his evaluation of the recent data on metronidazole treatment
failure. Gerding, supra note 230, at 1600. The marketer of Vancocin® is less cautious.
ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2008) (“We believe that changes in
the epidemiology of CDI, in particular the increasing frequency of severe disease, and data
suggesting that failure or relapse occur more commonly in patients treated with metronidazole
have led to an increase in the use of Vancocin.”).
273 McDonald, supra note 239. Research in 2009 confirms that CDAD continues to be a
serious problem. Jyotsna Jagai & Elena Naumova, Clostridium difficile-associated Disease in
the Elderly, United States, 15 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 343 (2009).
274 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 28, 2007).
275 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 2, 2006).
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This finding is consistent with the claim that resistance stimulates
innovation (H4). A product’s obsolescence through resistance276 creates
a market for another substitutable product. Here, for example,
resistance created CDAD, and wrought destruction on existing
treatments such as metronidazole, opening the way for oral
vancomycin.277 Of course oral vancomycin was not a new treatment,
but it had been temporarily sidelined due to its side effects and cost.
Metronidazole was originally the better drug, but with resistance
metronidazole lost absolute efficacy, and at some point metronidazole
became relatively less effective than oral vancomycin, especially for the
hypervirulent form of CDAD.278
Several other observations can be drawn that contrast with some
theoretical predictions. A key assumption in the patent holder waste
hypothesis (H1) is the threat of competitive entry by generic firms,
leading to a tragedy of the antibiotic commons.279 The oral vancomycin
(Vancocin®) story is quite different. First, despite generic entry in
1993 and the expiration of the last core oral patent in 1996, Vancocin®
remains the only oral form of vancomycin on the U.S. market today.280
But sales at current levels attract competitive attention. In March 2006,
ViroPharma filed an administrative petition to stay the approval of a
competitive oral vancomycin product on the grounds of inadequate
bioequivalence.281 ViroPharma is relying on non-patent intellectual
property and regulatory barriers to defend its lucrative market from

276 It appears that metronidazole’s growing treatment failure is not a result of resistance to
metronidazole itself, but due to increased use of other antibiotics. Daniel M. Musher et al.,
Relatively Poor Outcomes After Treatment of Clostridium difficile Colitis with Metronidazole, 40
CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1586, 1589 (2005) (“Specific resistance to metronidazole was
probably not a factor, because strains of C. difficile resistant to this drug have not been identified
at our medical center.”). For fluoroquinolones, the mechanism is accumulated resistance.
McDonald, supra note 239.
277 Evidence-based guidelines from the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
(SHEA) and the Infectious Diseases Society of American (IDSA) have noted the shifting need for
oral vancomycin to treat severe or recurrent CDAD. See ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form
10-K), at 2 (Feb. 28, 2008). The triggering event was the emergence in 2001 of the hypervirulent
strain exhibiting high levels of fluoroquinolone resistance. McDonald, supra note 239; Rocco
Ricciardi et al., Increasing Prevalence and Severity of Clostridium difficile Colitis in
Hospitalized Patients in the United States, 142 ARCHIVES SURGERY 624 (2007).
278 See supra Part III.A.1.
279 See supra Part II.C.
280 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2, 11, 25 (Mar. 2, 2009).
281 Letter from Michel de Rosen, Chief Executive Officer, ViroPharma Inc., to Andrew C. von
Eschenbach, Acting Commissioner of Food and Drugs, FDA (Mar. 17, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dockets/06p0124/06p-0124-let0001.pdf. The petition
was filed pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 10.35. See also ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-Q),
at 9 (Apr. 30, 2008). This filing compelled the company to evaluate an impairment or change in
the useful life of its vancomycin-related intangibles under SFAS No. 144. Id. I resist the urge to
explore the impact of U.S. public accounting standards on antibiotic resistance, but perhaps
someone else will engage in such an exploration.
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generic competition.282 In 2009, ViroPharma devoted millions of
dollars in legal fees to continue to delay market entry by this potential
competitor.283 Non-patent barriers can significantly delay generic entry.
Second, the threat of competitive generic entry has stimulated
paradigm-breaking R&D at ViroPharma. The company has begun a
research program to isolate non-toxigenic strains of Clostridium difficile
to be used as a re-colonization treatment after oral vancomycin.284 This
is an interesting project, headed by a leading Clostridium difficile
scientist, Dr. Dale Gerding. This small research program might side
step the entire question of resistance by colonizing the ecological space
with non-toxic Clostridium difficile bacteria.285 Phase I trials should
begin in 2009.286 Not all responses to the threat of competitive generic
entry waste the antibiotic commons, a point that is relevant to both H4
(resistance stimulates innovation) and H1 (patent holder waste).
Third, while H2 (patent holder conservation) suggests private
coordination under a single patent holder, Eli Lilly chose to fragment its
rights to oral vancomycin by a license to ViroPharma, diminishing its
ability to coordinate on a global basis. This license occurred just as oral
vancomycin sales took off. Eli Lilly retained the rights outside the
United States, and also continued to produce (for a time) intravenous
vancomycin. This property fragmentation occurred despite concerns
that oral vancomycin might contribute significantly to resistance.
Available data suggests that oral prescriptions of vancomycin may
create proportionately higher risks of VRE, but the datasets are
remarkably small.287 If the case is to be made for patent-based
coordination as an effective conservation strategy, oral vancomycin for
CDAD is not a good example. If scholars proffer other antibiotics as
282 Of course, Vancocin® has faced generic competition from metronidazole for years. My
statement refers to generic vancomycin.
283 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 49 (Mar. 2, 2009) (noting that legal fees
to delay the ANDA were $3.3 million in 2007, $4 million in 2008, and the company will spend at
“higher levels in future periods”). If generic entry boosted sales, then this litigation might still be
socially desirable as a conservation tool (H2). As seen above, generic entry does not necessarily
increase unit sales, since marketing tapers off with generic entry. See Lichtenberg & Duflos, supra
note 68.
284 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 28, 2008).
285 For a careful caution on probiotic commensal therapies, see Bernard Dixon, It’s a Little Bit
More Complicated than That, 9 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 399 (2009).
286 ViroPharma Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (Mar. 2, 2009).
287 In 1997, Gerding tried to suggest that oral vancomycin contributed modestly to VRE
overall, given the small volume of oral prescriptions at the time, but he did not deny the relatively
greater effect. Gerding, supra note 239 (noting as unclear the relationship between route of
administration and resistance); Levine, supra note 225, at S7. Other studies also raise concerns,
e.g., Philippe Van der Auwera et al., Influence of Oral Glycopeptides on the Fecal Flora of
Human Volunteers: Selection of Highly Glycopeptide-Resistant Enterococci, 173 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 1129 (1996), but the relationships remain unclear. Neil Woodford, GlycopeptideResistant Enterococci: A Decade of Experience, 47 J. MED. MICROBIOLOGY 849 (1998). All of
these studies occurred before the explosion of oral vancomycin use since 2004.
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examples of patent holder waste (H1), this study of oral vancomycin
suggests that we must carefully study the patent holder’s incentives
before reaching any conclusions. Next, we turn to another major use of
vancomycin, as an intravenous treatment for MRSA.
2.

Intravenous Vancomycin for MRSA

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a major
public health hazard with growing significance.288 The infectious
disease community has been tracking the rise of MRSA for decades,289
and vancomycin is today the most frequently chosen antibiotic for
MRSA.290 The increased prevalence of MRSA increases demand for
vancomycin291 and other useful antibiotics. While antibiotic innovation
in general is said to be moribund,292 MRSA innovation appears to be
flourishing, with many compounds in clinical trials.293 This is a
plausible example of hypothesis H4 (resistance stimulates
innovation).294 The multibillion-dollar MRSA market has attracted
significant market entrants with new products in the pipeline. In the
2009 “Fierce 15” list of the most promising small biotech companies,
four were working on anti-infective therapies, including novel
treatments for multi-drug resistant gram-negative bacteria, MRSA,
Pseudomonas aeruginosa, and novel vaccines for genital herpes and

288 Eili Klein, David L. Smith & Ramanan Laxminarayan, Hospitalizations and Deaths
Caused by Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999-2005, 13 EMERGING
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1840 (2007); R. Monina Klevens et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States, 298 JAMA 1763 (2007).
289 See, e.g., BAD BUGS, supra note 10; ALLIANCE FOR THE PRUDENT USE OF ANTIBIOTICS,
SHADOW EPIDEMIC: THE GROWING MENACE OF DRUG RESISTANCE 6 (2004), available at
http://www.tufts.edu/med/apua/print/GAARD.pdf. For examples abroad, see COMM. ON SCI. &
TECH., HOUSE OF LORDS, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—SEVENTH REPORT: RESISTANCE TO
ANTIBIOTICS AND OTHER ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS ¶ 1.5 (1998), available at http://
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/081vii/st0702.htm; and
Nordberg et al., supra note 2.
290 Klevens et al., supra note 288.
291 Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844; Donald P Levine, Vancomycin: Understanding Its
Past and Preserving Its Future, 101 S. MED. J. 284 (2008) (noting that the increased use of
vancomycin in the 1980s to treat MRSA has led to the emergence of VRE and VRSA).
292 BAD BUGS, supra note 10; Norrby et al., supra note 78; Talbot et al., supra note 40;
Wenzel, supra note 2. But see Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 562.
293 Ursula Theuretzbacher, Future Antibiotics Scenarios: Is the Tide Starting to Turn?, 34
INT’L J. ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS 15 (2009) (finding in the past decade a wave of Gram-positive
innovation driven by resistance, especially MRSA, and predicting a coming wave of Gramnegative innovation, also driven by resistance); Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844.
294 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293, at 15 (“Still, many years passed before an ever-increasing
mass of critical public health concerns regarding the rapid rise of MRSA forced open a market
niche window leading to a wave of anti-Gram-positive R&D mainly in small companies.”).
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pandemic and seasonal influenza.295 Drug companies are attracted to
these markets.
A recent article by Klein, Smith, and Laxminarayan reviewed the
costs of MRSA in the United States. They drew similar conclusions on
the relationship between MRSA and demand for vancomycin:
Another important implication of our analysis is that the increasing
incidence of MRSA in hospitalized patients, whether the infection
was acquired in the hospital or the community, is likely to increase
the demand for vancomycin. Despite several new (daptomycin,
linezolid, tigecycline) and old (trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole,
clindamycin) antimicrobial drugs available for treatment of MRSA
infections, vancomycin has remained the first-line drug for treating
MRSA. This pattern has broad implications for the future control of
MRSA as well as other pathogens. S. aureus infections resistant to
vancomycin are already emerging, and vancomycin-resistant
enterococci are already a major problem in hospitals. Vancomycin
use should be restricted to methicillin-resistant S. aureus infections
and used only for MRSA infections in situations where other drugs
are not appropriate.296

Note the interesting relationship between VRE and emerging
MRSA markets. If vancomycin were not showing some signs of
resistance, the incentive to create new compounds would be
weakened.297 Of course, if vancomycin were immune to resistance, the
medical need for new antibiotics would be much less pressing. The
potential obsolescence of vancomycin and other antibacterial agents is a
very important factor in creating new markets for MRSA drugs.298
Prominent examples include telavancin, a glycopeptide patented by
Theravance.299 Researchers have reported Phase 3 trials demonstrating
noninferiority of telavancin against vancomycin for hospital-associated
pneumonia (HAP) caused by MRSA and complicated skin and skin
structure infections (cSSSI) caused by MRSA.300 If approved by the
295 Posting of Christopher P. Singer to Patent Docs: Biotech and Pharma Patent Law and News
Blog, http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/fiercebiotech-announces-fierce-15-for-2009.html (June
30, 2009).
296 Klein et al., supra note 288, at 1844 (citations omitted).
297 Indeed, in the words of Theravance’s scientists, “[t]he emergence and spread of bacterial
resistance to vancomycin, in important antibiotic to treat serious infections caused by grampositive bacteria, has prompted active research to discover new glycopeptides and semisynthetic
analogs with improved antimicrobial properties.” Deborah L. Higgins et al., Telavancin, a
Multifunctional Lipoglycopeptide, Disrupts Both Cell Wall Synthesis and Cell Membrane
Integrity in Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, 49 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS &
CHEMOTHERAPY 1127 (2005).
298 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293, at 15 (“Antibiotics focused on Gram-positive bacteria,
including MRSA, are proving to be commercially attractive and are encouraging investment in
R&D, as has been shown with the commercial success of Pfizer’s linezolid and later Cubist’s
daptomycin in the USA.”).
299 Higgins et al., supra note 297.
300 Samuel E. Wilson et al., Telavancin Versus Vancomycin for the Treatment of Complicated
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FDA, the market for telavancin will have been created, in large part, by
growing resistance to vancomycin and the fear of a widespread outbreak
of vancomycin-resistant S. aureus (VRSA). Similar concerns motivated
the research programs for daptomycin, tigecycline, and linezolid, three
first-in-class antibiotics.301 But none of these drugs work better than
vancomycin against MRSA,302 at least not yet.
Conversely, effective conservation methods dampen the immediate
need for new antibiotics.303 Linezolid is a new first-in-class antibiotic
that is increasingly used in lieu of vancomycin for ventilator-associated
pneumonia.304 As Paterson notes, the clinical evidence for preferring
linezolid to vancomycin is subject to important questions,305 another
way of saying that, absent resistance, vancomycin might be the better
drug. Linezolid is still under patent, which means the company can
attempt to persuade doctors to switch to linezolid based on these
studies. If intravenous vancomycin were still patented, it is likely that
the patent holder would market to physicians to point out the
weaknesses in these studies and to try to curtail the switch to
linezolid.306 In this case, becoming generic may actually reduce the
marketing pressures to prescribe vancomycin and allow the patented
competitor to market without contradiction. From a medical standpoint,
this may mean less than optimal prescribing, as physicians act on a
biased version of the medical evidence. These marketing practices also
weaken the patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2), since
preserving linezolid for future use might better serve social welfare so
long as vancomycin remains effective. This is an interesting cross-class
effect: In order for patent holder conservation (H2) to work, a single
Skin and Skin-Structure Infections Associated with Surgical Procedures, 197 AM. J. SURGERY
791 (2009). For a summary of the ATTAIN 1 and ATTAIN 2 clinical studies, see Theravance
Announces FDA Acceptance of Telavancin NDA for the Treatment of Hospital-Acquired
Pneumonia, MED. NEWS TODAY, Apr. 12, 2009, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/
145436.php.
301 Theuretzbacher, supra note 293; Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at
560-61.
302 Arias & Murray, supra note 110, at 440-41.
303 See, e.g., Huang et al., supra note 202 (finding that routine surveillance for MRSA in the
ICU followed by contact isolation of MRSA cases yielded a large and statistically significant
reduction in MRSA bacteremia).
304 Paterson, supra note 85.
305 Id. at 487 (“However, there are two important caveats to these findings. Firstly, these
results are a subgroup analysis of a larger study that showed no overall difference between
linezolid and vancomycin for hospital-acquired pneumonia. Indeed, the FDA does not recognize
claims of superiority of linezolid over vancomycin for this condition. Secondly, the vancomycin
dosage used in these studies was 1 g every 12 h given intravenously. Many clinicians are now
using larger doses of vancomycin and aiming for trough concentrations of vancomycin of ≤ 20
mg/L. A randomized trial is now underway comparing linezolid with higher doses of
vancomycin for hospital-acquired pneumonia.”).
306 In the U.S. market, generic drug manufacturers do not market to physicians or consumers.
Pharmacies generally dispense only one generic version of a particular drug.
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company would need to hold exclusive rights to both vancomycin and
linezolid. Since intravenous vancomycin has been off patent since
1980, patent holder conservation (H2) does not appear to be possible for
linezolid.
Other interesting incentive effects were at play with vancomycin
and MRSA which support the resistance stimulates innovation
hypothesis (H4). The original patent (’099) was filed on September 16,
1955.307 For many other successful drugs, the innovator company and
others race to file follow-on patents for incremental improvements to
the drug. These drugs are sometimes derisively labeled “me-too” or
“evergreen” drugs, but follow-on antibiotic innovation can improve
important characteristics, such as reducing toxicity or improving
mechanisms against resistance. Vancomycin was not a successful drug
at launch, or indeed for its first twenty-five years. Eli Lilly apparently
did not file follow-on patent applications for vancomycin until the early
1980s.308 Eli Lilly resurrected a moribund research program as MRSA
began to emerge. The new patents included both process patents309 and
compound patents on novel glycopeptides.310 As of 2009, vancomycin
was still the only glycopeptide approved for use in the United States.
The FDA recently denied Targanta’s application for a second
glycopeptide (oritavancin), and that compound’s future remains
uncertain.311 MRSA was responsible for resurrecting intravenous
vancomycin.
Veterinary use of glycopeptides (e.g., avoparcin) weakens the
patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2), suggesting that a patent
holder may not make decisions to maximize human health. The small
human market for vancomycin in the 1960s and 1970s led Eli Lilly to

307
308

U.S. Patent No. 3,067,099 (filed Sept. 16, 1955) (issued Dec. 4, 1962).
Most of the early patents citing the ’099 patent were from Eli Lilly & Company, including
the first fourteen: U.S. Patent No. 4,440,753 (filed Mar. 15, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,462,942
(filed July 30, 1982); U.S. Patent No. 4,495,179 (filed Dec. 16, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,537,770
(filed Oct. 18, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,547,488 (filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,548,924
(filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,548,925 (filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,552,701
(filed Apr. 16, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,558,008 (filed Dec. 13, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,558,009
(filed Dec. 27, 1983); U.S. Patent No. 4,559,323 (filed Aug. 2, 1984); U.S. Patent No. 4,604,239
(filed June 11, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,639,433 (filed Aug. 14, 1985); U.S. Patent No. 4,643,987
(filed Aug. 14, 1985). All of these were filed in the early 1980s and issued from 1984 to 1987.
309 Including the ’753, ’942, and ’179 patents. All of these patents were issued to Eli Lilly &
Company.
310 These included the ’488, ’924, ’925, ’701, ’008, ’433, and ’987 patents and U.S. Patent No.
4,698,327 (filed Apr. 18, 1986). All of these patents were issued to Eli Lilly & Company.
311 Reuters, Targanta Drug Appears Similar to Rival—US FDA Staff, FORBES.COM, Nov. 17,
2008, http://www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2008/11/17/afx5703072.html. Oritavancin was initially
developed by Lilly, then out-licensed to InterMune, who finally sold it to Targanta. Oritavancin
was rejected by FDA in December 2008 due to lack of evidence of effectiveness in one of their
studies that was done many years ago by Eli Lilly. Targanta has been recently acquired by The
Medicines Company and may (or not) plan a new Phase 3 program for oritavancin.
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focus more on animal uses of glycopeptides, especially in Europe.312
Eli Lilly’s research teams were focused on antibiotics for use in animal
feeds, resulting in several patents filed in the mid- to late-1970s.313 In
addition, several of the 1984-1987 flurry of Eli Lilly patents citing ’099
were for animal growth promotion with low-dose antibiotics in feed.314
Researchers have identified these growth promotion uses of
glycopeptide antibiotics as troublesome for resistance.315 Europe has
now banned their use, and the FDA also restricted the off-label use of
glycopeptides in animals.316
Eli Lilly deployed scientific uncertainty to claim they were not
deliberately wasting glycopeptides through the sale of avoparcin animal
feeds. The company raised skeptical questions about the scientific
evidence for human resistance through the animal feed mechanism. In
1998, three Lilly scientists wrote: “In view of these data, the need to
invoke a second mechanism for the spread of vancomycin-resistant
bacteria in humans due to avoparcin use in Europe remains open to
debate.”317 Eli Lilly eventually lost this debate.318 These events weaken
312 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303 (noting that avoparcin, an animal feed glycopeptide,
was never approved in the United States but was widely used in Europe).
313 U.S. Patent No. 4,083,964 (filed Sept. 13, 1976) (issued Apr. 11, 1978) (increasing feed
efficiency through antibiotics in animal feed); U.S. Patent No. 4,122,168 (filed May 23, 1977)
(issued Oct. 24, 1978) (detailing new antibiotic A-35512, useful as an antibiotic against dental
caries and for growth promotion in animal feed); U.S. Patent No. 4,331,594 (filed Nov. 14, 1980)
(issued May 25, 1982) (detailing new antibiotic A-21978, an antibacterial agent and useful in
growth promotion in poultry). All of these patents were assigned to Eli Lilly and Company.
314 Including the ’770, ’323, ’239, ’545, and ’331 patents. All of these patents were issued to
Eli Lilly & Company.
315 Frank Møller Aarestrup et al., Glycopeptide Susceptibility Among Danish Enterococcus
faecium and Enterococcus faecalis Isolates of Animal and Human Origin and PCR Identification
of Genes Within the VanA Cluster, 40 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 1938 (1996);
A.E. Van den Bogaard et al., High Prevalence of Colonization with Vancomycin- and
Pristinamycin-Resistant Enterococci in Healthy Humans and Pigs in the Netherlands: Is the
Addition of Antibiotics to Animal Feeds to Blame?, 40 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 454
(1997); W. Witte, Impact of Antibiotic Use in Animal Feeding on Resistance of Bacterial
Pathogens in Humans, in ANTIBIOTIC RESISTANCE: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, SELECTION AND
SPREAD (Derek Chadwick & Jaime Goode eds., 1997). But see Kirst et al., supra note 223, at
1303 (noting the lack of relationship between animal glycopeptide use in Europe and resistance to
vancomycin). For studies on other antibiotic classes used in animal feeds, see H. GREGG
CLAYCAMP & BARRY H. HOOBERMAN, FDA CENTER FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE,
VIRGINIAMYCIN RISK ASSESSMENT: RISK ASSESSMENT OF STREPTOGRAMIN RESISTANCE IN
ENTEROCOCCUS FAECIUM ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE USE OF STREPTOGRAMINS IN ANIMALS (Nov.
23, 2004) (draft for comment), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/
CVMUpdates/UCM054722.pdf.
316 Extralabel Animal Drug Use; Fluoroquinolones and Glycopeptides; Order of Prohibition,
62 Fed. Reg. 27,944 (May 22, 1997) (codified as amended at 21 C.F.R. § 530.41 (2009)). For a
recent overview, see Terence J. Centner, Regulating the Use of Non-Therapeutic Antibiotics in
Food Animals, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2008); see also David L. Smith et al., Animal
Antibiotic Use Has an Early but Important Impact on the Emergence of Antibiotic Resistance in
Human Commensal Bacteria, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6343 (2002).
317 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1304.
318 The evidence is stronger today on the linkage between antibiotic use in animals and the
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the patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2). Drug companies may
not be trustworthy as long-term stewards of antibiotics, even in the
absence of generic competition.
Eli Lilly’s animal feed research program also requires a
modification to the patent holder waste hypothesis (H1): Facing a small
and temporarily unimportant human market, the company had no reason
to conserve vancomycin and could profit from sales in animal feeds. If
waste occurred here,319 the cause was the small human market, not the
time-limited nature of patents. A longer term on the ’099 patent would
not have delayed Eli Lilly’s diversification given the small human
market. This is an important constraint on using this data to support
longer patent terms.
B.

Class Coordination

Vancomycin also presents a natural illustration of the difficulties of
class coordination, which would be required for patent holder
conservation (H2). A solution to the resistance problem discussed by
some is to expand antibiotic patent scope to encompass the entire class,
giving full ownership of the class to a single company or a group of
companies operating a patent pool under an antitrust waiver.320 In this
world, Eli Lilly would have had a perpetual patent on all
glycopeptides.321 These proposals raise a host of issues, some of which
I have discussed previously.322 Class-based patents are an unwieldy
path to continued antibiotic effectiveness.
transfer of mobile genetic elements of resistance to the human population through the global food
trade. Remi M. Ajiboye et al., Global Spread of Mobile Antimicrobial Drug Resistance
Determinants in Human and Animal Escherichia coli and Salmonella Strains Causing
Community-Acquired Infections, 49 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 365, 370 (2009) (“These
data suggest that food-producing animals are a major reservoir for integrons carrying
antimicrobial drug-resistant genes.”); Ellie Herschberger et al., Quinupristin-Dalfopristin
Resistance in Gram-Positive Bacteria: Mechanism of Resistance and Epidemiology, 38 CLINICAL
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 92, 96 (2004) (“Considering the effect that antimicrobial resistance as on
human health and also its economic impact, measures to preserve these agents and delay the
development of resistance are urgently needed. This includes judicial use of antibiotics for
infection in humans, control measures to prevent the spread of resistant pathogens in health care
facilities, and the decrease of resistance in reservoirs such as the environment and animal
husbandry.”).
319 Waste is difficult to prove in agricultural uses because the relationship between agricultural
use and human infection with resistant bacteria is complex and occasionally counterintuitive. See
Marc Lipsitch, Randall S. Singer & Bruce R. Levin, Antibiotics in Agriculture: When Is It Time to
Close the Barn Door?, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5752 (2002).
320 LAXMINARAYAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 13; Laxminarayan, Scope of Antibiotic Patents,
supra note 51. For prior critiques of this concept, see Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain,
supra note 4, at 94-99; and Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563.
321 Ironically, Eli Lilly discovered and out-licensed vancomycin, oritavancin, and daptomycin.
322 Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99; Outterson et al.,
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As discussed in Part IV.A.1 supra, Eli Lilly effectively controlled
the glycopeptide class but did not act to conserve it. To the contrary, it
fragmented property rights in the class through licensing. Nevertheless,
it might be possible empirically to test patent holder conservation (H2)
with vancomycin. In the United States, vancomycin has never faced
patented competition within the glycopeptide class,323 but in Europe, a
second glycopeptide has been marketed for several years. If patent
holder conservation (H2) on a class basis was an effective strategy, one
hypothesis worth testing would be a comparison of the U.S. and E.U.
glycopeptide markets. The patent holder conservation hypothesis (H2)
would predict less resistance in the United States and more resistance
within the glycopeptide class in Europe over the past decades since
Europe has faced competition within the class. Older data on
comparative glycopeptide resistance levels in the United States and
Europe do not give a clear result.324 Perhaps other factors such as
conservation efforts in Europe have offset any patent holder waste
effect.325 An empirical study should be undertaken to resolve this
question.
Class-based resistance also afflicts fluoroquinolones. The leading
hospital antibiotic, levofloxacin, is a member of the fluoroquinolone
class,326 as is ciprofloxacin (Cipro®), a major generic antibiotic. From
current medical evidence on resistance, a patent-based conservation
strategy to protect levofloxacin may well require the “re-patenting” of
ciprofloxacin,327 which recently entered the public domain, and perhaps
other members of the fluoroquinolone class. While this would be a
boon to levofloxacin’s patent owner (Ortho McNeil), it would raise
many legal and practical problems. First, granting class-based antibiotic
patents is a quite radical departure from existing practice, dramatically
widening the scope of patents. Second, re-patenting public domain
ciprofloxacin might be quite difficult. Generic ciprofloxacin is a global
best seller, with many manufacturers in multiple countries. Third,

Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 563.
323 Oritavancin is not yet approved in the United States. U.S. FDA, Orange Book, supra note
233 (searching for “oritavancin” returns no hits) (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). Another
glycopeptides is teicoplanin (marketed in Europe by sanofi-aventis as Targocid®). It has been
used for many years outside the United States.
324 Compare Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303-04, with Henrik Caspar Wegener, Historical
Yearly Usage of Glycopeptides for Animals and Humans: The American-European Paradox
Revisited, 42 ANTIMICROBIAL AGENTS & CHEMOTHERAPY 3049 (1998).
325 Kirst et al., supra note 223, at 1303-04 (explaining that Europe controls the hospital use of
vancomycin more tightly than the United States).
326 Levofloxacin is the leading antibiotic used in U.S. hospitals. MacDougall & Polk, supra
note 125.
327 Re-patenting is not possible under existing law; this discussion is theoretical. Bayer would
also need to control its copyrights and trademarks in Cipro®, even if it had allowed them to lapse
during the unpatented period.
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mathematical models of resistance do not clearly specify the best course
of action for class coordination; it seems likely that class coordination
actions designed to minimize resistance would expand the risk of
treatment failure in particular patients, an unsavory dilemma.328 Finally,
the Constitutional basis for re-patenting the public domain seems open
to challenge. As interesting as these issues are, we will save them for
another day, for at present Congress does not appear interested in classbased patents or re-patenting the public domain.
One complicating factor for patent holder conservation is the
ability of drugs to create resistance in other antibiotic classes.329
Vancomycin is associated with increased resistance to daptomycin.330
Daptomycin is the first-in-class lipopeptide, also discovered by Eli
Lilly, but now licensed to Cubist Pharmaceuticals; daptomycin entered
the U.S. market in 2003 as Cubicin®.331 These two drugs (vancomycin
and daptomycin) are in different classes (glycopeptides and
lipopeptides, respectively), and vancomycin has been generic for
decades. Patent-based coordination would be very difficult between
these drugs. Class-based coordination to protect daptomycin would
require giving Cubist Pharmaceuticals patent control over both
lipopeptides and glycopeptides, privatizing both the public domain
(vancomycin) and taking by eminent domain or compulsory license all
ongoing research projects by other companies in these classes, such as
Theravance’s telavancin, a glycopeptide for which Theravance is
currently seeking FDA approval, and oritavancin, a glycopeptide
controlled by Targanta for which the company is also seeking FDA
approval.
A final interesting point is that the need to coordinate resistance
between vancomycin and daptomycin could have been avoided: Eli
Lilly & Company discovered both compounds but chose to fragment the
rights—licensing oral vancomycin to ViroPharma for U.S. use only
(geographical fragmentation), and licensing daptomycin to Cubist
Pharmaceuticals (class-based fragmentation). In both cases, it may be
presumed that Eli Lilly was well positioned to understand these drugs;
in fact, it probably had the best information available concerning its
discoveries. And yet Lilly chose to fragment its rights voluntarily. It is
hard to reconcile this history with H2 (patent holder conservation); at
the very least, we cannot assume that a single patent holder will
conserve an antibiotic class through superior coordination.
328 Y. Claire Wang & Marc Lipsitch, Upgrading Antibiotic Use Within a Class: Tradeoff
Between Resistance and Treatment Success, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9655 (2006).
329 See Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 4, at 94-99 (collecting sources).
330 Pakyz et al., supra note 125; Jean B. Patel et al., An Association Between Reduced
Susceptibility to Daptomycin and Reduced Susceptibility to Vancomycin in Staphylococcus
aureus, 42 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1652 (2006).
331 Outterson et al., Antimicrobial Patents, supra note 4, at 560.
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Comparing Hypotheses to the Vancomycin Case Study

From the foregoing discussion of vancomycin, we can summarize
in Table 3 several conclusions about the seven hypotheses.
Table 3. Case Study Results Regarding Vancomycin and Other
Antibiotics
Hypothesis
H1. Patent holder waste

•

•

•

•
H2. Patent holder
conservation

•
•
•

H3. Patent incentives are •
inadequate for production
•
•

Case Study Results
Patent
holders’
actions
with
vancomycin do not appear to fit the
patent holder waste paradigm, as the
patent had already expired
Even with non-patent barriers, the
actions of the sole marketer of
vancomycin were not consistent with
patent holder waste
Drug companies may have sold some
antibiotics without much regard to
resistance, but the impact on
vancomycin resistance during the
patent term was small, so waste was
not created
Marketing by the patent owner
typically declines in the last few years
of patent life, which is contrary to H1
Little evidence was found that patent
holders
exercised
long-term
stewardship to conserve vancomycin
Eli Lilly did not promote class-based
conservation, but fragmented property
rights
Generic entry might actually decrease
sales when brand name marketing is
suspended
Market demand and medical need for
vancomycin were more important than
patent incentives
Reimbursement may be a more
effective policy lever than patent law
Non-patent barriers to free-riding can
be important
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H4. Resistance stimulates
innovation

•
•
•

H5. Conservation
dampens production

•

H6. Excessive regulation
dampens production

•

H7. Antibiotic
externalities are
predominantly negative

•

•

•

•
•
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Penicillin and methicillin resistance
stimulated the development of
vancomycin
MRSA and CDAD greatly stimulated
the vancomycin market
MRSA stimulated many new research
programs, anticipating resistance to
vancomycin
Conservation reduces unit sales, but
may promote overall social welfare
Most of the conservation of
vancomycin was not deliberate policy,
but the result of environmental factors
such as available substitutes in the
early years with fewer side effects
Not examined here, as the FDA
regulations in question arose largely
after vancomycin reached the market
CDAD, and to a lesser extent, MRSA
are negative effects of antibiotic use
that directly harm the patient taking
antibiotics
Both CDAD and MRSA also generate
negative
externalities
beyond
particular patients and institutions as
resistant infections spread to others
Proper internalization of antibiotic
costs to the patient often fails due to
information deficiencies
Some MRSA- and CDAD-related
germ-shed externalities will be
positive under conservation programs

Patent holder waste (H1) and patent holder conservation (H2)
emerge from this case study having sustained significant damage.
Patent holders did not appear to engage in waste near the end of the
patent term, but they also did not carefully nurture important antibiotics
for the long-term good of society. Generic entry may not be the
resistance disaster that some assume, as marketing pressures subside in
the last few years of patent life and thereafter. In any case, one cannot
make a case for longer patents as a conservation tool based on the

OUTTERSON.31-3

676

1/28/2010 6:09:35 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

vancomycin experience. Sales data from other leading hospital
antibiotics bolstered the conclusions from vancomycin.332
The vancomycin case study strongly challenges the third
hypothesis (H3, patent incentives are inadequate for production). The
shorter seventeen-year patent term333 was sufficient for the discovery
and commercialization of vancomycin without additional incentives,334
and non-patent incentives such as FDA rules relating to marketing
approval protected follow-on innovation. More importantly, market
demand was more significant than patent status for vancomycin.
Patents proved inadequate when medical need did not materialize, and
once the medical need was clear, the patents had expired. This evidence
should be considered in light of the broken market linkages between
medical need and actual reimbursement to drug companies, as discussed
in Part III.C. If the goal is improved health on a population basis,
modifying patents will have little benefit so long as reimbursement is
not sufficiently tied to medical need.335 The vancomycin case study
suggests that if reimbursement is sufficient, patents will be less
important. Perhaps H3 should be modified with three plausible
extensions for antibiotic markets:
• H3a: Reimbursement incentives are inadequate for production;
• H3b: Reimbursement is a powerful policy lever for production;
and
• H3c: Reimbursement policy is more important than patent
policy.
This Article does not go so far as to claim to have firmly established
any of these alternative hypotheses, but it offers them for further study
in light of the vancomycin experience.
The evidence is strong for the hypothesis that resistance stimulates
innovation (H4), which indeed is central to the history of vancomycin
for both CDAD and MRSA. These results are consistent with the
theoretical analysis in Part III.A, and they upend conventional wisdom
from the IDSA and similar policy advisors. Resistance is not a
hindrance to innovation, but actually promotes it.
The fifth hypothesis (H5, conservation dampens production)
appears to be correct, but most of the U.S. market response to
vancomycin followed external environmental factors other than policydriven conservation.
The experience with vancomycin is not
inconsistent with this claim; this claim is simply unproven. The
332
333

See supra Chart 1 and accompanying text.
At the time, patent terms in the United States were seventeen years from issue. After
adoption of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement in 1994, the United States changed
its patent term to twenty years from filing.
334 This statement approaches a tautology in a study of a commercialized drug.
335 See Projan, supra note 74; Wenzel, supra note 2.
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theoretical analysis in Part III.B also challenges the policy impact of
H5, suggesting that conservation may actually promote socially
valuable outcomes.
Through an accident of history, vancomycin was set aside for
decades. The tantalizing question is whether we can deliberately
replicate these conditions for other important antibiotics. One possible
approach would be a public purchase of the patent at a generous price
commensurate with the value of the drug. The companies would be
paid for their valuable patents based on a prize model rather than
through current sales. For a generic drug like vancomycin, to the extent
we are concerned about post-patent waste, the federal government could
assert control without the need to compensate a patent holder. A few
important antibiotics should be put on the shelf for decades and reserved
only for the most extreme cases, creating a Strategic Antibiotic
Reserve.336
The sixth hypothesis (H6, excessive regulation dampens
production) was not a significant factor with vancomycin, as
vancomycin reached the market many years before the relevant FDA
regulations.
Finally, hypothesis H7 (antibiotic externalities are largely
negative) remains an open question, although some interesting questions
have been raised. If Medicare begins to punish hospitals financially for
MRSA infections, the externalities of hospital infection control will
become a much more salient topic. It also appears that some major
costs are actually internal but go unrecognized by patients, physicians,
and institutions due to a lack of information. The solution here would
be better information on the negative consequences of consuming
antibiotics; this information is not likely to come from the patent
holders. Finally, some conservation programs will generate positive
externalities within a germ-shed.337
CONCLUSION
This Article reminds us to test theory against experience. It is said
that battle plans often fail to survive first contact with the enemy. In the
present study, the case study with vancomycin calls for significant
changes to our theoretical models.
When faced with a common pool resource problem, context
matters. We should not reflexively choose solutions from our favorite

336
337

See supra note 46 and sources cited therein.
See supra note 100 and sources cited therein.
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Sector, but must evaluate which tools will be most effective in the
specific situation.
For antibiotics, the conventional wisdom emphasizes IP-based
solutions. This Article counsels caution before we expand antibiotic
intellectual property rights, lest our good intentions result in a
counterproductive reduction in antibacterial effectiveness. The most
effective and immediate solutions might be based on conservation rather
than production, and on reimbursement rather than patent law.

